In Defense of Patient-Centered Theories of Deontology: A Response to Liao and Barry

S. Matthew Liao and Christian Barry argue that the patient-centered approach to deontology that I have developed—the restricting claims principle (RCP)—‘is beset with problems.’ They think that it cannot correctly handle cases in which a potential victim sits in the path of an agent doing what she needs to do for some greater good, or in which a person’s property is used to benefit others and harm her. They argue that cases in which an agent does what would be permissible but acts on a malicious reason show that agent intentions, rather than patientclaims, are fundamental to deontology. And they claim that the RCP presupposes the means principle in a way that shows that it is not really offering anything new. I argue here that all of these charges are mistaken. Doing so allows me to offer important refinements to the RCP, to highlight two common mistakes in reasoning about cases, and to set challenges for agentcentered approaches to deontology.

     

The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments

To what extent do party labels influence individuals’ policy positions? Much research has examined this question in the United States, where party identification can generate both in‐group and out‐group pressures to conform to a party's position. However, relatively little research has considered the question's comparative generalizability. We explore the impact of party labels on attitudes in Brazil, a relatively new democracy with a fragmented party system. In such an environment, do parties function as in‐groups, out‐groups, or neither? We answer this question through two survey experiments, one conducted on a nationally representative sample and another on a convenience sample recruited via Facebook. We find that both in‐ and out‐group cues shape the opinions of identifiers of Brazil's two main parties but that cues have no effect on nonpartisans. Results suggest that party identification can structure attitudes and behavior even in “party‐averse” electoral environments.     

Mental disorder as the cause of a crime

An offender's punishment can be reduced when a court decides that his mental disorder reduces his responsibility for what he did. Courts have sought to establish whether a mentally disordered offender's responsibility is reduced by asking whether his disorder caused the crime. Acceptance of this “causation by mental disorder” criterion has fluctuated, however. This may be because causal explanations are not the types of explanations we are accustomed to offering for the kinds of acts that bring defendants, and psychiatric witnesses, to court. More often, we offer what philosophers have called “possibility” explanations for these acts. The application of psychiatry to possibility explanations has not been widely explored. It offers the potential for the improved use of psychiatric evidence in criminal proceedings.