Rights Restoration and the Entanglement of US Criminal and Civil Law: A Study of New York's “Certificates of Relief”

Despite burgeoning interest in prisoner re‐entry and the “collateral consequences” of criminal convictions, we know little about the practical operation of policies governing the rights and privileges of people with criminal convictions. This study examines New York's Certificates of Relief from Civil Disabilities to explore the workings of the US carceral state at the intersection of criminal and civil law. These certificates remove some legal restrictions accompanying convictions, particularly licensure barriers, and are easier to achieve than pardons; other states have used New York's policy as a model. Interviews with judges and probation officers reveal deep variations in how they understand and award certificates. In some cases, differences stem from informal local agreements, particularly concerning firearms in rural communities; in others, from discretionary judgments in a context of legal ambiguity. These practices demonstrate how specific legal, organizational, and cultural factors contribute to complexity and variation in the US carceral state.     

Wrongdoing Without Motives: Why Victor Tadros is Wrong About Wrongdoing and Motivation

A central principle in Victor Tadros’s book, The Ends of Harm, is the means principle (MP) which holds that it is, with limited exceptions, impermissible to use another as a means. Tadros defends a subjective, intention-focused interpretation of the MP, according to which to use another as a means is to form plans or intentions in which the other serves as a tool for advancing one’s ends. My thesis here is that Tadros’s defense of the subjective interpretation of the MP is unsuccessful. To make that case I argue for three claims. First, the subjective interpretation has implausibly harsh implications in certain cases, implying that certain people would be guilty of much more serious wrongs than they can plausibly be thought to have committed. Second, the cases that Tadros offers to argue that the subjective interpretation of the MP must be right are better interpreted as showing that it is impermissible to act on an illicit intention – one that would direct an agent under certain, foreseeable circumstances to perform impermissible acts – than that it is impermissible to act for an illicit reason. Third, while Tadros correctly rejects the objective, causal-role-focused interpretation of the MP – according to which to use another as a means is for the other to play the causal role of means to the good which might be offered to justify the act one performs – there is another way of defending the significance of causal roles, one that has implications that track those of the MP fairly closely. I argue elsewhere at length for this other principle, which I call the Restricting Claims Principle. Here I simply sketch the basic idea in a way sufficient to show that one can escape the dilemma that the MP faces without grabbing either the subjective or the objective horn, and without moving into a consequentialist world in which it is permissible to punish the innocent for the sake of the general welfare.