Excepted substances: a comparison of Federal and state laws.

A state law has placed an obligation on the criminal investigation laboratories to screen and quantitate all preparations, both pharmaceutical and illicit, that fall under the provisions of "Excepted Substances." Without complete screens on these preparations, there is room for erroneous indictments as well as possible acquittals on technicalities.     

'Appropriate' Policy Knowledge, and Institutional and Governance Implications

The papers in this special section of AJPA are the product of a symposium held in Brisbane in February 2003, which was jointly sponsored by the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and the Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet. Three papers were delivered. David Adams, from the Victorian Public Service, delivered a paper entitled 'Usable knowledge and public policy'. Wayne Parsons, from the University of London, gave a paper 'Not just steering but weaving: Relevant knowledge and the craft of building policy capacity'. Randal Stewart, a policy consultant based in Sydney, gave a paper entitled 'Public sector reform knowledge production'. The purposes of this paper are to highlight salient points from the papers and to assess briefly the institutional and governance implications of taking at last some steps beyond the currently prevailing rationalist approaches to policy and governance.     

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.     

Umbau des Sozialstaates? Österreich und Deutschland im Vergleich

In comparative analysis of welfare states, there is a consensus that mature welfare state systems have been confronted, for some considerable time, with substantial pressure towards re-structuring and that, as a result, they actually have undertaken several and varied modifications. This articles aims at exploring and analysing these developments in Austria and Germany from a comparative point of view. The analysis concentrates on two vital fields of social policy: old-age insurance and unemployment insurance. Especially in respect of the development of social policy and regarding important characteristics of the two welfare state systems, both countries traditionally show a large degree of resemblance to each other. Many similarities remained to exist during the phase of growing pressures on the welfare state, whereas at the same time it is evident that differences between the two countries increased. The respective actual developments will be interpreted in the light of corresponding theories of comparative welfare state research and classified as gradual and structural changes.     

Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers?

Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school‐based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low‐performing students face in retaining and attracting high‐quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low‐performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low‐performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Regulatory budgeting: A bad idea whose time has come?

Advocates of regulatory relief propose a budget that would annually cap regulatory costs. But emulating fiscal budgeting would be much more difficult than they envision. An arbitrary macrobudgetary constraint would have to be selected, and the potential scope of the regulatory budget would be vast. The process of regulatory budgeting would be very-time consuming, and could increase micromanagement by the Congress. Estimating regulatory costs would be challenging, and ignoring regulatory benefits would be unfair and inefficient. A preferable alternative to regulatory budgeting would be to expand the Government Performance and Results Act to include cost-effectiveness reviews for regulations.