Attempted Drug‐facilitated Sexual Assault—Xylazine Intoxication in a Child

There are only a few cases of drug‐facilitated sexual assaults on children reported in the literature so far. Here, a case of a four‐year‐old boy is presented. He was unconscious, and the accompanying adults reported that the child had been at a playground on his own. Returning home, he complained of having been stung and collapsed immediately. Urine and serum samples of the child were investigated. In the toxicological analysis, xylazine, a sedative and muscle relaxant used in animals, was detected. Subsequent quantification by GC/MS after solid‐phase extraction revealed 0.053 mg/L xylazine in serum and approximately 0.63 mg/L in urine. Furthermore, the child was examined by a forensic medical specialist. Police investigations revealed that the godfather, who had been previously accused of sexual abuse of children, had injected the child with the drug, possibly in preparation for a shared bath.     

Social Justice and Moral Reasoning: An Empirical Integration of Two Paradigms in Psychological Research

Distributive and procedural justice are of central importance to past and current theories of the psychology of moral development and the social psychology of justice. In order to explicate the relationships among theories, participants responded to both a measure of moral reasoning and a measure of 15 various justice criteria. Analyses showed that each schema of moral reasoning was significantly predicted by different concerns about social justice. Furthermore, individuals' judgments about justice were best represented by four factors, offering a broader definition of justice in relation to moral schemas. The findings were consistent with Kohlbergian theory; moral reasoning appears to proceed from concerns about self-interest to distributive fairness to procedural justice.     

Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.     

Punishment and Security

Policymakers and the public widely believe that punishment can reduce crime and therefore improve security. Empirical data, however, prove the preventive effect of punishment to be very limited at best. Especially, the assumption that imposing longer sentences will reduce crime rates seems erroneous. In our opinion, this misconception is due to a confusion of time perspectives: Criminal law necessarily looks back to the past, as it reacts to a deed. Security, on the other hand, means preventing dangers, and its focus must be the future. Hence, time orientation of criminal law and the logic of protection clash. Criminal law cannot provide the security wished for. The same mistake is repeated in the prevalent theories of punishment, notably the relative or unified theories of punishment. Security cannot be achieved or fostered through harsher punishment or punishment threats. On the other hand, one means of decreasing crime is increasing the number of policemen.     

Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts

In his recent book Attempts, Gideon Yaffe suggests that attempts should be criminalized because of a principle he dubs the “Transfer Principle.” This principle holds that if a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized. Although Yaffe provides a powerful defense of the Transfer Principle, in this paper I argue that Yaffe’s argument for it ultimately does not succeed. In particular, I formulate two objections to Yaffe’s argument for the Transfer Principle. First, I argue that a basic assumption about criminalization, on which Yaffe’s argument crucially depends, is incomplete, and Yaffe’s own attempt to supplement it undermines his argument for the Transfer Principle. Second, I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not properly account for the fact that those who merely attempt a crime and those who complete it might sometimes be responding to reasons in different ways. Accordingly, I conclude that Yaffe has not succeeded in establishing the truth of the Transfer Principle.