On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality.     

On the Structure of Legal Principles

The author offers a sketch of his thesis that legal principles are optimization commands. He presents this thesis as an effort to capture the structure of weighing or balancing and to provide a basis for the principle of proportionality as it is applied in constitutional law. With this much in place, he then takes up some of the problems that have come to be associated with the optimization thesis. First, he examines the objection that there are no such things as principles, but only different modes of the application of norms. Second, he discusses problems concerning the concept of an optimization command and the character of the “ought” contained in principles. He concludes that the distinction between commands to optimize and commands to be optimized is the best method for capturing the nature of principles.     

The Special Case Thesis

The author outlines his thesis that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse ( Sonderfallthese ) and develops it as an attempt to cover both the authoritative, institutional, or real and free, discursive, or ideal dimension of legal reasoning. On this basis, he examines the objections raised by Habermas (1996) to the special case thesis. First, he discusses the reduction of general practical discourse to moral discourses ( genus proximum problem) holding that the former is a combination of moral, ethical, and pragmatic arguments within the priority of just; second, he examines the objection that general practical arguments change their character or nature when employed in legal contexts (subset and specification problem) and the related problems concerning legal validity and unjust law. He concludes proposing a procedural (opposite to a coherential) integration of general practical arguments in the legal context.     

Internet offenders: traders, travelers, and combination trader-travelers

The Internet opens a vast array of communication, entertainment, and educational resources for children; however, it also opens a gateway to home and school for offenders who wish to exploit children. A convenience sample of 225 cases published in the news media was examined. The cases were classified using law enforcement terminology to describe Internet offenders as traders, travelers, or combination trader-travelers. The media is seen as a critical source of information for the public to be aware of how the Internet is being used to commit sexual exploitation and sex crimes against children.     

An economic model of social sensitivity: The case of individual criminal behavior

In general, economists have modeled criminal behavior as a problem in time allocation under uncertainty. Their Friedman-Savage utility models have been based on the binomial probability distribution and then tested using aggregate data on crime rates and neglect the nonpecuniary aspects of crime. This paper overcomes the shortcomings of previous work. Specifically, criminal activity is modeled with an underlying geometric probability process and explicitly accounts for the moral and social compromise involved in becoming a criminal. The empirical model enables the quantification of the criminal's moral and social sensitivity using data based on a consolidated file of police records and a cohort survey of criminals and noncriminals. On the basis of this unique data set, it is found that the included individual criminals are risk averse and that gang membership reduces social sensitivity.     

Giovanni Battista Ratti's Critique of Principles Theory

Ratti has attacked principles theory in two respects. The first is that it is impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. The second is that the main thesis of principles theory, which says that balancing is the specific way of applying principles, is wrong. The result of Ratti's critique is his thesis that principles theory founders on a contradiction or, as Ratti calls it, an antinomy. All of this is based on two arguments: Ratti's disapplication argument and his law of concretization. I attempt to reject this analysis, for it is incomplete. It claims to be an analysis of balancing, but it misses the decisive point of balancing. Informed by this background, I defend the distinction between rules and principles as a distinction of the real and the ideal “ought.”