Miracle to meltdown: A pathology of the East Asian financial crisis

The financial crisis in East Asia was made more dramatic by the fact that the region's performance in terms of economic growth over the preceding decade had been widely perceived as a 'miracle'. What was it that transformed the region's fortunes, and what are the chances for a speedy economic recovery? Systematic analysis reveals that, while there is no unicausal explanation, and while few if any commentators anticipated the crisis before the event, the fundamental difference from previous international financial crises is the extreme indebtedness of the corporate sector of the crisis countries. Private sector repayment difficulties and the associated banking crises triggered the sudden withdrawal of capital and the collapse of exchange rates. Failure to address the underlying private sector debt overhang, and reliance instead on conventional macroeconomic policy solutions, have led to a decline in output and a depreciation in exchange rates which have been far greater than need have been the case.     

On Biehl's Defense of Bookchin's Immanent Dialectic

Stephen G. Bunker. Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985.

Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn: The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the Amazon. Harper Perennial, New York, 1990.

Chico Mendes: Fight for the Forest: Chico Mendes in His Own Words. (Additional material by Tony Gross). Latin American Bureau, London, 1989; distributed in U.S. by Monthly Review Press.     

Local government in Europe: Retrenchment,restructuring and British exceptionalism

This article compares the strategy of British governments towards elected local government following the onset of fiscal stress in the mid‐1970s with those of two other western European countries with a unitary system of government: France and Sweden. The conclusion reached is that, notwithstanding different national configurations of central‐local government relations and the distinctiveness of the British strategy, there are similar policy and institutional outcomes in each case. In so far as such outcomes are taking place irrespective of the party political or ideological complexion of governments, they are consistent with a neo‐Fordist interpretation of local government restructuring.     

Failure of auditors: The lack of compliance for business combinations in China

This empirical study investigates the compliance of 344 Chinese listed companies with the Accounting Standard for Enterprises No. 20‐Business Combination, a mandatory reporting standard applicable to companies involved in business combinations. China has recently reformed its auditing sector, enabling private firms to provide auditing services. The results of the study show a low level of compliance by Chinese listed companies. While companies audited by Chinese domestic auditors have significantly lower compliance than companies audited by Big Four auditors on supplementary disclosure that is mandatory under the Chinese accounting standards, compliance remains low even after companies receive unqualified reports from these international auditors. There appears to be a lack of commitment, and possibly expertise, among Big Four auditors, in fully applying the reporting requirements of the business combination standard in a Chinese setting. This raises concerns about the independence of Chinese auditing in disclosing reliable information about business combinations. Broader theoretical contributions of the paper go beyond the Chinese context by problematizing whether well‐resourced international auditors uphold internationally expected standards or succumb to local non‐compliant practices.     

Political Institutions and Conservation Outcomes: Wildlife Policy in Zambia

“Messy” democratic political institutions might generate ineffective conservation policy watered down by competing interest groups and rival political parties. A hardcore environmentalist may believe that a pro‐conservation dictatorship would be the type government best able to meet her goals. Such an environmental fantasy became reality in Zambia under President (1972‐1991) Kenneth Kaunda. But despite his dictatorial powers, he did not have much success in curbing the poaching epidemic that swept through Zambia in the 1970s and 80s. The structure of the one‐party state, together with a fall in the price of Zambia's principal export (copper) and a concomitant increase in the value of many wildlife products, created an environment that generated incentives for politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to disregard Kaunda. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom about the politics of one‐party states. It shows that even in the case of one‐party government, the structure of political institutions remains critical to the extent of a dictator's control.