Psycho-social, ethical and legal arguments for and against the retrospective release of information about donors to donor-conceived individuals in Australia

In the February 2011 report on its inquiry into the past and present practices of donor conception in Australia, the Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee called for the introduction of legislation to regulate donor conception in all jurisdictions that do not have it in place "as a matter of priority". It further called for the establishment, "as a matter of priority", of a national register of donors to enable donor-conceived individuals to access identifying information about their donor. The Senate Committee left open the question as to whether the legislation and central register should have retrospective effect. This article focuses upon that question. It shows that arguments concerning the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of some donors who may wish to remain anonymous are outweighed by the manifest injustice faced by donor-conceived individuals who are denied access to such information, as well as their families and donors who wish to exchange this information,     

Is state power to protect health compatible with substantive due process rights?

Public health laws may mandate drastic limitations on individual liberty, such as forced medication and quarantine. This results in a tension between public health laws and guarantees of liberty such as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has resolved this tension in favor of one or the other of these legal principles, depending on the facts and issues involved. Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence is internally consistent. The Court has applied a level of scrutiny that, while rigorous, is more flexible than strict scrutiny. I denote this as "enhanced public health scrutiny." Applying this scrutiny, the Court will uphold public health legislation if it protects an inchoate class of people who may not yet be identifiable, who will incur a specific disease or injury absent the law, but who will not experience this disease or injury if the law is enforced. If this doctrine were explicit, it would constitute a clear guideline to courts seeking to balance health and liberty concerns. This guideline would be consistent with current case law, and would not impact on law affecting reproductive liberty.     

Procedural Innovation and the Surreptitious Creation of Judicial Supremacy in the United Kingdom

In Re an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review, the Supreme Court made unfavourable comments about Northern Irish abortion legislation in a way which showed complete disregard for elements of civil procedure which are a foundation of proper adjudication within the context of respect for democracy. This was but the latest of a number of cases in which the senior judiciary has made unaccountable procedural innovations furthering judicial supremacy in defiance of the sovereignty of Parliament. In addition to Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, two other of these cases, Simmons v. Castle and R (Miller and another) v. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, will be discussed. These cases reveal an effort to create judicial supremacy by means which we are obliged to call surreptitious.