Occupational Class and Vote in the 1949 Norwegian Election. Research Note

In 1948–49 the Sociology Office of the University of Oslo, under the guidance of Prof. Paul Lazarsfeld of Columbia University, initiated a series of studies on the Norwegian economic planning system. Part of this Planning Project was a national election survey in the fall of 1949, on a modified probability sample of 2600 people. The results show the paramount influence of economic class on voting, interpreting class as a combination of employer/employee relationship, property ownership, prestige-status, and income. Indicators of the homogeneity of class environment also played a role. Given the occupational structure of Norway, the Labor party had to win over part of the non-working-class population to obtain control of the government. They did this by winning about 1/3 of the white-collar vote, and about 1/4 of the farmers and fishermen. The policies of economic stabilization - control of inflation through price controls, wage controls, food subsidies, and rationing, and maintenance of full employment under conditions of "suppressed inflation" - were crucial to winning over these white-collar and farm voters.     

Brexit,Fisheries and Scottish Devolution: An Intergovernmental Disruption

With the UK set to leave the EU, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) will no longer apply and an alternative legislative framework will need to be put in place, simultaneously navigating the devolved settlement. However, aspects of fisheries management fall under the area of international negotiation which is reserved to the UK government. Disagreements between the UK and Scottish governments over where the line between devolved and reserved lies in this matter has led to difficulties in formulating a post‐Brexit fisheries framework. This dispute has exposed weaknesses in relations between the two governments.     

The Fall and Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative Organisation

The fall of the Santer Commission, prompted by the Report of the Committee of Independent Experts, sent shock waves throughout the entire Community. This article seeks to examine the nature of the problems which beset the Commission, to place these within the broader context of decision-making by public bodies, and to consider also the responsibilities of the Council and European Parliament for the delivery of agreed Community policies. The article analyses in detail the Reports of the Committee of Independent Experts, and the subsequent reforms initiated by the Prodi Commission, in order to assess the prospects for improved service delivery in the future.