Political variables in political socialization: Reply to “the dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence”

In this paper two arguments are advanced with regard to parental influence on adolescent political attitudes. First, variables like parental affect, which are of considerable theoretical interest to social psychologists, are of relatively little interest to the system-level concerns of political scientists because of their lack of variance. Second, the additive issue salience/perceptual accuracy model I proposed (1974) is a better fit to the data than a multiplicative cue-giving/parental affect model proposed in this journal by Cundy (1979). The fit of the two models is tested with the Jennings (1965) socialization data.Cundy, D. T. The dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence.Political Behavior, 1979,1, 269–284.     

Assessing the results of public expenditure: program evaluation in the Canadian federal government

Abstract. In an attempt to tighten up its financial systems and improve control of expenditures, the Canadian federal government has set up a new office, that of the Comptroller General. One of this Office's responsibilities is to administer the Treasury Board's policy on program evaluation, which says that all government programs should be periodically reviewed for their effectiveness in meeting goals and for the efficiency with which they are managed. The paper describes the Office's approach to program evaluation, reviews program evaluation policy in three other countries and discusses the principles and practical problems which limit the application of evaluation research. Evaluation activity in Canada is endangered in its cradle by two threats: the tendency of proponents to over-exuberance; and the cynics' view that the activity is of such limited applicability that potential savings are negligible. A third problem is a tendency to fuse together policy-related and management-related assessment activity. Evaluation activity conducted from the operational management point of view which takes program goals for granted will surely result in sequences of small victories and economies. This is worth doing well. But the dramatic import of effectiveness evaluation as a ‘bottom line’ for judging the worth of whole programs — that is, as a policy tool — should not be allowed to generate false expectations about the scope for improvement in routine management of the public service. Sommaire. En vue de fortifier ses systèmes financiers et d'améliorer le contrôle exercé sur ses dépenses, le gouvemement fédéral canadien a créé un nouveau poste, celui du Contrôleur général. Une des responsabilités de cette function est d'administrer la politique du Conseil du trésor en matière d'évaluation de programmes. Cette politique exige que les programmes gouvernementaux soient évalués périodiquement afin de déterminer leur efficacitéà rencontrer leurs objectifs ainsi que la capacité de rendement de leur gestion. Ce document décrit l'approche du Bureau du Contrôleur général en matière d'évaluation de programmes; examine les politiques correspondantes dans trois autres pays; et discute des principes et des problèmes pratiques qui limitent l'applicabilité de l'évaluation en recherche.     

Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations

Presidents traditionally have had great success when nominating justices to the Supreme Court, with confirmation being the norm and rejection being the rare exception. While the confirmation process usually ends with the nominee taking a seat on the Court, however, there is a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes the Senate to act. To derive a theoretical explanation of this underlying dynamic in the confirmation process, we draw on a spatial model of presidential nominations to the Court. We then employ a hazard model to test this explanation, using data on all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since the end of the Civil War. Our primary finding is that the duration of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. We also find evidence that suggests that the duration increases for critical nominees and chief justices and decreases for older nominees, current and previous senators, and nominees with prior experience on state and federal district courts .