Book reviews

A. L. Meiendorf, Optimizatsiya khozyaistvennykh reshenii: metod analiza prirashchenii. Series: Aktual'nye problemy sel'skogo khozyaistva. Moscow: ‘Ekonomika’, 1976.

Oliver H. Radkey, The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia. A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region, 1920–21. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1976. xiv+457 pp. $12.95.

Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev—The Years in Power. London: OUP, 1977. xi+198 pp. £3.95.

Daniel F. Calhoun, The United Front: the TUC and the Russians, 1923–1928. Cambridge: CUP, 1976. 450 pp. £10.50.

Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce. Anglo‐Soviet Relations 1924–27. Cambridge: CUP, 1977. 289 pp. £9.00.

Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976. 302 pp. $14.95.

Donald R. Kelley, Kenneth R. Stunkel, Richard R. Wescott, The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Japan. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976. 335 pp.

Fred Singleton (ed.), Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1976. xvii+103 pp. $13.50. £8.80.

Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order. Politics and Social Change in the USSR. New York: The Free Press, and London: Collier MacMillan, 1976. xii+274 pp. £11.05.

Richard Szawlowski, The System of the International Organizations of the Communist Countries. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1976. 322 pp.

Jürg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London: Macdonald & Jane, 1977. 348 pp. £7.95.     

Book reviews

David Granick, Enterprise Guidance in Eastern Europe. A Comparison of Four Socialist Economies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1976. xvi+505 pp. £17.20 or £6.10 (paperback).

A. Zauberman, Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning (Concepts, Methods, Techniques). London: OUP for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976. xiv+464 pp. £17.00.

H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1976. 924 pp. £31.30 or £10.50 (paperback).

Alex Pravda, Reform and Change in the Czechoslovak Political System: January‐August 1968. Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences, vol. 3, series No. 90–020 (Contemporary European Studies Series). Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976. 96 pp. £1.30.

R. G. Gidadhubli (ed.), Fifty Years of Soviet Power—a Study of Social, Economic and Political Developments. Centre of Soviet Studies, University of Bombay, 1976. 295 pp. 29 rupees.

Occasional Papers, Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Jawalharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Nos. 2 and 3, 1976 (mimeographed).

Adam B. Ulam, A History of Soviet Russia. London: Martin Robertson, 1976. viii+312 pp. £5.00.

Olga A. Narkiewicz, The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics 1867–1970. London: Croom Helm, 1976. 314 pp. £7.95.

Jacques Levesque, L'URSS et la révolution cubaine. Montreal: Presses de 1'Université de Montréal, 1976. 221 pp.

John B. Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries. Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1976. 344 pp. $18.50.

Brian Hunter, Soviet‐ Yugoslav relations 1948–1972: a bibliography of Soviet, Western and Yugoslav comment and analysis. New York and London: Garland, 1976. 223 pp. $20.00.     

Techniques and processes of administration

Abstract. Since the Glassco Commission in the early sixties there has been a plethora of administrative changes: Program Planning and Budgeting, Operational Performance Measurement Systems, Management by Objectives, and Cost/Benefit Analysis have all been introduced as technical panaceas. In terms of processes, some should probably have been changed but remain the same(such as the personnel selection-promotion process), while others have been circumvented (the regular budgetary process). Still others have been changed (the cabinet committee process) but have produced results of questionable value and perhaps positive harm to majority governments. It is contended that the Glassco injunction ‘let the manager manage’ and the assumption that private sector practices should be adopted by government, virtually without modification, ignore fundamental differences between the two sectors. The war between competing interest groups is inevitable and hence perpetual. Governments engage in a rolling set of compromises between factions in an essentially adversarial process under rules, formal and informal, that restrict the field of battle. Frequently, those who advocate administrative changes are in pursuit of their personal interests. They frequently find themselves in alliances with one or more of the contending parties who look upon them as guns for hire to be used or rejected on strategic grounds. After an impressionistic critique of each of the processes and techniques previously cited, the paper ends on a more positive note. There is a plea that the powers of the auditor general be expanded to encompass reporting upon (as distinct from undertaking) the extent to which a ministry is carrying out efficiency and effectiveness studies, where there is a consensus about the validity of the data and methodology. It is also suggested that the auditor general report upon the disposition of these studies with the aim of breaking down present secrecy barriers. A better informed public would change the incentive structure within which ministers, aided by officials, reach their decisions. Sommaire. Depuis la Commission Glasscoe, au début des années 60, il y a eu une pléthore de changements administratifs. La Planification et l'établissement des budgets par programme, les systèmes de mesure des performances opérationnelles, la gestion en function des objectifs, l'analyse des coûts et avantages, tous ces systèmes ont été utilisés comme panacées techniques. Du point de vue des processus, certains, qui auraient dû sans doute être changés ne l'ont pas été (comme par exemple la sélection du personnel et le processus de l'avancement) alors que d'autres ont été contournés (le processus budgétaire normal). D'autres encore ont été changEeAs (le processus des comités de cabinet) mais pour produire des résultats de valeur douteuse et parfois franchement défavorables pour les gouvernements majoritaires. L'auteur soutient que l'impératif de la Commission Glasscoe « laisser gérer les gestionnaires » et le postulat suivant lequel les pratiques du secteur privé devraien être adoptées pratiquement sans modification par les gouvernements ignorent les différences fondamentales qui existent entre les deux secteurs. La lutte entre des groupes aux intérêts divergents est inévitable, et done perpétuelle. Les gouvernements s'engagent dans tout un jeu de compromis dynamiques entre les différentes factions dans ce qui essentiellement un processus antagoniste, à l'intérieur de règies formelles ou non formelles, qui réduisent la portée du conflit. Fréquemment, ceux qui réclament des changements administratifs le font dans leur propre intérêt et ils se trouvent souvent alliés à un ou plusueurs des partis d'opposition qui les considèrent comme des mercenaires à utiliser ou rejeter pour des raisons stratégiques. Après une critique subjective des divers processus et techniques cités précédemment, l'auteur conclut sur une note plus positive. Il demande que les pouvoirs de l'Auditeur général soient étendus pour qu'il fasse connaître (et non pas pour qu'il étudie) la mesure dans laquelle les ministères effectuent des études sur l'efficience et l'efficacité, là où il existe un consensus quant à la validité des données et de la méthodologie. Il propose aussi que l'Auditeur général fasse rapport sur l'usage qui est fait de ces études, afin de supprimer le secret qui l'entoure actuellement. Un public mieux informé transformerait la structure de la motivation qui entoure actuellement les ministres qui prennent des decisions et leurs fonctionnaires.     

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Challenging the Property Rights Paradigm in Botswana

Recent work in international studies and comparative politics scrutinizes the relative importance of ideas, interests, and institutions as sources of policy change. A growing body of scholarship identifies ideas as the main causal factors, influencing perceived interests as well as perceived policy options. Others contend that policies can best be understood as products of institutions. Neither explanation can account for both policy choice by politicians and the implementation strategies of administrators. In Botswana, the use of professional criteria for hiring and advancement encourages adherence to international professional norms within the bureaucracy, but electoral competition gives politicians more reason to be attentive to local political concerns. The institutions that define relations of authority among actors with different motivations shape the outcomes of policy choice and implementation. Institutions influence the attentiveness of policy-makers to ideas when making decisions, the degree of attention particular policy-makers give to ideas from particular sources, and the degree of acceptance that ideas must achieve to affect policy. Better evaluations of political development can be achieved through attentiveness to the mix of actors involved in policy decisions, the diversity of institutions and ideas that affect their policy preferences, and the relations of authority that shape their relative influence over policy choice and implementation.     

Testing the Buchanan-Wagner Hypothesis: European Evidence from Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests

According to the Buchanan-Wagnerhypothesis, public deficits reduce theperceived price of public goods to thecurrent generation of voters who, in turn,increase the demands for such socialservices. Several recent studies haveattempted to test this proposition. In thispaper, we apply modern time seriestechniques organized around panel unit rootand panel cointegration to draw sharperconclusions from the short time series thatare typically available. We find that thereis a long run positive relationship betweengovernment spending and government deficitsfor each country individually, as well asfor the panel as a whole. This providessupport for the BW hypothesis. We alsoanalyze the implications for the relativeproductivity performance of the public andprivate sector, the existence of scaleeconomies in the provision of publicservices, as well as the extent of crowdingout effects.     

The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models

The size of the Pareto set in the issue space of spatialvoting models is a function of the tax prices that voters arecharged. When all voters pay Lindahl prices for all goods, thePareto set collapses to a single point. The Pareto set can beenlarged by altering tax shares so they are further fromLindahl prices, and can be reduced by moving toward Lindahlpricing. A smaller Pareto set moves voters closer to consensuson issues, so reduces political decisionmaking costs and makesthe political system more stable.