"Glättung" von Annuitätensprüngen durch Aufnahme von Sukzessivdarlehen und WGG

Der Beitrag besch?ftigt sich erstmals eingehender mit der Frage, ob es mit dem WGG vereinbar ist, wenn von gemeinnützigen Bauvereinigungen – in Ver?nderung der ursprünglichen Finanzierungsstruktur der Baulichkeit – Sukzessivdarlehen aufgenommen werden, um solcherart die aufgrund des Schlagendwerdens von Annuit?tensprüngen bei ?ffentlichen F?rderungsdarlehen drohende Erh?hung des von den Mietern und Nutzungsberechtigten zu leistenden periodischen Entgelts "abzufedern", diese Annuit?tensprünge insoweit also zu "gl?tten". Die enorme praktische Relevanz dieser Fragestellung liegt angesichts der (gegenw?rtig wieder einmal ?u?erst hitzigen) politischen Debatte um leistbares Wohnen bzw Wohnkosten als "Preistreiber" auf der Hand.     

Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally, we provide a categorization of different types of parties and analyze the impact of certain voting rules (Plurality Rule, Plurality Run Off, Hare System, Condorcet Method, Approval Voting, Borda Rule, Evaluative Voting, and Majority Judgment) on the performances of parties in those scenarios.     

Fatalismus. Über eine vernachlässigte Stütze sozialer Ordnung

Most sociological explanations tacitly assume that contemporary social orders are based on the propensities of active, purpose-driven entities. These explanations underestimate the stabilizing effects of fatalistic patterns which make members accept even those social arrangements that they do not appreciate, and prevent discontent from being translated into a critique of society. This kind of fatalism cannot only be found among the utterly powerless. There also is a fatalism of the privileged (which sometimes takes the form of “positive thinking”), as well as a kind of fatalism particular to social elites. This elite fatalism also demonstrates how fatalism, since it eases the burden of thinking about alternatives, has action-enabling effects (which are part of this stabilizing mechanism). In order to analyze these order-sustaining mechanisms, this paper first reconstructs a self-critique of sociological normativism going from Durkheim to Bourdieu and to Boltanski to then take up classical pragmatist ideas that help us to understand fatalism as a particular type of socially mediated reflexivity.     

The Role of the Internet in Political Campaigns in Germany

The Internet has become an important infrastructure for political campaigns around the world, and various online tools have become pervasive campaigning devices. Still, most research on the role of the Internet and online tools in political campaigns focuses on US presidential campaigns. Due to the specific institutional context in the US, this research might not provide realistic observations about the role of the Internet in future campaigns in other countries. Researchers will have to enrich the debate through systematic studies of the role of the Internet and various online services in campaigns in political, legal and cultural contexts different from those prevailing in the US. This special issue aims to add to the discussion by presenting a number of empirical studies focusing on the role of the Internet and various online services during the campaign for the German federal election of 2009 and its aftermath.     

Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law

In the literature on the economics of tort law the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept has been undisputed. In particular, the existence of a Cournot-Nash safety equilibrium has been taken for granted, given the usual convexity assumptions. In this paper a simple model of strict liability with the defence of contributory negligence is considered. Liability is assumed to be limited. It is shown that for a certain range of liability limits no Cournot-Nash safety equilibrium in pure strategies exists. A mixed strategy equilibrium exists but it turns out to be suboptimal.