Intra-provincial fiscal decentralization,relative wealth,and healthcare efficiency: Empirical evidence from China

Decentralizing fiscal power to locally elected governments is often regarded as beneficial for public service efficiency. However, questions remain about whether decentralizing fiscal responsibilities work well in countries lacking political decentralization. In China, fiscal decentralization has significantly strengthened the role of local governments in the provision of healthcare services, but evidence of its efficiency effects is scarce. To cast light on this issue, this study investigates the relationship between intra-provincial fiscal decentralization and the productive efficiency of healthcare services in China. Analysis of panel data for 2006–2017 suggests that expenditure and revenue decentralization from provincial to sub-provincial governments significantly improves healthcare efficiency. Further analysis suggests that the positive impact of healthcare expenditure decentralization on healthcare efficiency may be stronger in wealthier provinces. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications.     

Rhetoric in municipal amalgamations: a comparative analysis

ABSTRACT

There is a large literature that seeks to evaluate municipal amalgamations ex post, but a relative dearth of scholarly inquiry into the practical political task of persuading the public to accept amalgamations ex ante. We address this important gap in the literature by conducting a rhetorical analysis to ascertain what types of arguments are believed to be efficacious for persuasion on amalgamation. We find evidence to suggest belief in the efficacy of persuading the public through recourse to various projected dreadful consequences, particularly amongst opponents of amalgamation. We conclude by considering some of the reasons behind the observed rhetorics and briefly outline one possible solution.     

The (Il)logics of Federal Budgeting,and Why Crisis Must Come

The U.S. federal budgeting system faces severe challenges in coming years. Deficits are being recorded at levels and with regularity not seen in prior periods. This article suggests that such problems reflect the uncomfortable mix of logics informing budgetary and political institutions—that is, the rules of the game. Logics make it appropriate to expect that government be limited in its tax demands but simultaneously responsive in providing expensive services necessary for the achievement of the American dream, for example. Crisis is needed to allow the emergence of institutional forms that mediate between these conflicting logics.     

An institutional assessment of the public interest and accountability committee (PIAC) in Ghana’s oil and gas sector

ABSTRACT

Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act 815 (amended to Act 893 in 2015) established the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) in 2011 with the mandate to ensure accountability and transparency in the management and usage of oil and gas revenue. This paper critically examines the activities and operations of the PIAC from 2011 vis-à-vis its legally reposed mandate. It points to severe deficit in accountability but improvements in transparency in the management of oil and gas revenues in spite of the existence and operations of the PIAC. After eight years of operation, the PIAC continues to suffer monumental challenges that undermine its effectiveness in serving as an accountability and transparency initiative in Ghana’s oil and gas sector. The paper makes some recommendation based on the empirical challenges of the PIAC identified to strengthen the PIAC to deliver effectively on its mandate.