Four myths in the history of social thought

Four commonly held interpretations of the development of European social thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are analysed and criticised, with particular reference to Durkheim's writings. These four myths are: the notion that Durkheim's sociology developed in substantial degree as a response to the ‘problem of order’; the conception that Durkheim's work is to be understood in terms of its origins in ‘conservative’ social thought; the view that Durkheim's writings, together with those of some of his contemporaries, mark a radical break in the transition from ‘social philosophy’ to ‘sociology’; and the idea that the type of intellectual tradition represented by Durkheim, concerned with the ‘problem of order’, can be usefully compared with a divergent tradition concerned with ‘conflict’ and ‘change’. It is argued that while these myths each contain a kernel of truth, this can only be extracted if Durkheim's writings are examined in relation to the historical context in which he developed his sociological concerns.     

Governments,NGOs and agricultural development: Perspectives on changing inter‐organisational relationships

There are divergent interests in involving NGOs in public sector programmes of agricultural development. Some commentators seek to foster popular participation through such involvement, while others view it largely within the logic of public sector cutbacks. Using material primarily from Latin America, and also from Africa and Asia, the potential gains and risks inherent in a range of NGO‐government relationships are considered. Strengths and weaknesses in NGO development strategies and practice are reviewed, and potential public sector contributions discussed. While closer relationships between NGOs and governments seem likely to emerge in the context of current public sector reform, the form these relationships will assume is less clear and will probably be highly diverse.     

An African Conception of Human Rights? Comments on the Challenges of Relativism

The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to develop more plausible conceptions of human rights whose philosophical foundations are closely aligned with culture-specific ideas about human nature and/or dignity. This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. Along the way, it distinguishes between two meanings of the term African contending that to the extent that the practice of prizing the ‘community’ higher than any other value is definitive of African, the idea of African human rights remains suspect.