Managing the negotiation agenda

Conclusion The agenda is one of the main structural elements of negotiation, in addition to such questions as site, identification of participants, and elements of timing. Together, they answer the who, what, when, and where questions. As with other aspects of negotiation, the agenda can be used either manipulatively to enhance leverage or to improve the prospects for agreement and the possibilities for mutual gain. In most cases, it will be used both ways, reflecting the nature of negotiation as a mixed-motive situation.Although it can be instrumental to volunteer as a sole source to write the agenda, in most cases it becomes a joint activity to construct a consensual basis for subsequent negotiation. In these situations, agenda-building becomes one of the pre-negotiation activities that set the tone for the relationship (Saunders, 1985). In other situations, the parties may engage in actual negotiation without a formal or written agenda. When this occurs, the risks and uncertainties may be high but the party who appreciates the importance of the informal agenda has a tremendous advantage.Whether one plans it or not, during the course of negotiation the parties will discuss a finite set of issues in some sequence and from a particular perceptual framework. Consciousness of the universality and centrality of the agenda is prerequisite to guiding negotiation to a successful conclusion. William R. Pendergast is Associate Dean at Boston University's Metropolitan College, 755 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02215, where he teaches graduate courses and executive development seminars on negotiation. He is preparing research on power and influence, and on strategic choice in negotiation.     

Book reviews

William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (Eds.), Gorbachev and his Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine (Westview Press, 1990, 239pp. ISBN 0–8133–7898–2)

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harvard University Press, 1990)

Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 1989. ISBN 0–8014–2125–X.

Scalpino, R.A., The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth‐Century Asia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, pp.131)

Sean M. Lynn‐Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen van Evera (Eds.), Soviet Military Policy (MIT Press, 1989. £26.95 [cloth]; £13.50 [paperback]).     

Custody decisions in Alabama before and after the abolition of the tender years doctrine

This study investigated the impact of the abolition of the tender years doctrine on custody decisions in divorce cases. This doctrine supported the presumption that the mother is the more suitable parent for young children. In March of 1981, the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama found this doctrine to be unconstitutional. To assess the hypothesis that this ruling had a significant effect on custodyrelated decisions, a sample of court records for divorce cases in an Alabama county was examined as representative of the state on a number of key variables. Overall, no significant differences were found on indicator variables for the comparisons before and after the ruling. There was neither an increase in custody grants to fathers nor an increase in custody requests by fathers.     

Tension, compression, and shear: directions, stresses, and outcomes of health care cost control

"Control" of health care costs is often portrayed as a struggle between external, "natural" forces pushing costs up and individuals, groups, and societies trying to resist the inevitable. This picture is false. Control includes strenuous efforts by some to raise costs, and by others to resist those increases, and/or to transfer costs to someone else. But all such forces originate in the purposes and interests of individuals and groups. Health care cost control is a struggle among conflicting interests over the priorities of a society, and claims of "inevitability" are simply part of the political rhetoric of that struggle. International experience supports certain conclusions. First, there is no basis for the claim that limits on expenditure growth must threaten the health of (some members of) a society. Second, there is a substantial variety of experience with cost control. Failure in the United States is often presented as evidence of the impossibility of control, but most other countries have succeeded. Finally, control requires the direct confrontation of interests, with substantial build-up of stress. Advocates of expansion are more successful if they can transform compressive forces into efforts to shift the burden onto someone else. Pressures from providers in every country for "privatization" and/or payment by users reflect this recognition of economic interest.