Bremse oder Gaspedal? Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Wirkung der direkten Demokratie auf den Steuerstaat

This article analyzes the relationship between the different forms of direct democratic participation and the size of the tax state in the Swiss cantons for the period from 1983 to 2000. The analysis distinguishes between the different effects of the financial referendum and the initiative. Theoretical arguments suppose that the financial referendum curb the tax state, whereas the initiative is expected to contribute to its growth. Pooled time series analyses show that legal conditions of direct democratic participation in general and especially the legislation on financial referenda are much more important than the frequency of plebiscites for the explanation of the different sizes of the tax states in the cantons. As an additional result of the analyses, the impact of direct democracy on the tax state turns out to be much larger in the 1990s compared to the decade before.