The effect of repeated questioning on children's accuracy and consistency in eyewitness testimony

Purpose. In police interviews children may be asked the same question many times. We investigated how the number of repetitions and the interval between those repetitions affected the accuracy and consistency of children's responses. Methods. 156 children aged 4–9 years watched a staged event and were interviewed individually 1 week later. Children were asked eight open‐ended questions, which were each repeated a further four times (making a total of forty questions). Half these open‐ended questions could be answered from information in the event, and half were unanswerable (so children should have said ‘don't know’ in response to these questions). The questions were repeated in gist form. The interval between an initial question and its repetitions was varied by use of other questions and twenty non‐repeated filler questions. The intervals between repetitions were immediate repetition, repetition after a delay of three intervening questions, after a delay of six intervening questions, and after ten or more intervening questions. Results. Over a quarter of children's responses to repeated questions changed, usually resulting in a decline in accuracy, particularly after the first repetition. Subsequently, the number of repetitions and delay interval had little effect on responses to answerable questions although accuracy to unanswerable questions continued to decline. Conclusions. Question repetition had a negative affect on children's consistency and accuracy. For unanswerable questions in particular, the more often a question was repeated the more likely children were to invent a response.     

Kollision wild lebender Tiere mit einem Kraftfahrzeug

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Kein genereller Schutzanspruch gegen Lichtimmissionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000

We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final‐passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree‐conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills—results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.