Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­     

The Road Not Taken and the ‘Bad Faith’ Thesis: Why a Liberal Democrat–Labour Coalition Never Happened in May 2010

This article examines why a Liberal Democrat‐Labour Coalition did not result from inter‐party negotiations after the General Election in May 2010 and whether the coalition which did emerge was based on a marriage of ‘neo‐liberal minds’, as claimed by Andrew Adonis in his <i>5 Days in May</i> (Biteback, 2013). Consideration of the available evidence, however, suggests a more nuanced conclusion. It is expected that the 2010 agreement will be revisited in preparation for a possible hung parliament in 2015.     

MINISTERIAL ADVISERS,POLITICIZATION AND THE RETREAT FROM WESTMINSTER: THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster‐styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand’s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial findings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these findings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil‐ or public‐service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the findings affirm or refute the view that the ‘third element’ constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand’s system of government – once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight deficiencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.     

Climbing the Greasy Pole: Promotion in British Politics

This article addresses the subject of ministerial promotion and is based on memoirs and interviews. It seeks to discern the essential qualities which motivate political ambition; for example extremes of energy, confidence, optimism and family support. The talent pool for office is held to be worryingly shallow though allowing wider access, via the Lords, has not so far proved a huge success. Deciding upon appointments is also analysed as is the means politicians use to advertise their suitability for office. It concludes that, natural ability notwithstanding, luck and courage are often the chief attributes of success.