"三个代表" 重要思想的生命力

“三个代表”重要思想是中共的行动指南,探讨这一思想的生命力,是用这一思想更好指导实践的根本要求,也是使这一思想不断获得丰富发展的根本要求。一、从“三个代表”重要思想的实践特征理解其生命力马克思恩格斯从辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义立场出发,向来认为实践是其学说形成和发展的唯一源泉。“社会生活在本质上是实践的”,马克思主义哲学的这一科学命题,蕴含着作为人类生活和社会发展规律概括的马克思主义充满生命力的根本原因。同样,“三个代表”重要思想也具有鲜明的实践特征。“三个代表”重要思想回答对中国共产党执政领导的重大…     

Law of Denial

Law’s claim of mastery over past political violence is frequently undermined by reversals of that relationship of mastery, so that the violence of the law, and especially its symbolic violence, becomes easily incorporated into longues durées of political violence, rather than mastering them, settling them, or providing closure. Doing justice to the past, therefore, requires a political and theoretical attunement to the ways in which law, in purportedly attempting to address past political violence, inscribes itself into contemporary contexts of violence. While this may be limited to an analysis of how law is an effect of and affects the political, theoretically this attunement can be further refined by means of a critique of dynamics that are internal to law itself and that have to do with how law understands its own historicity, as well as its relationship to history and historiography. This article aims to pursue such a critique, taking as its immediate focus the ECHR case of Perinçek v Switzerland, with occasional forays into debates around the criminalisation of Armenian genocide denialism in France. The Perinçek case concerned Switzerland’s criminalisation of the denial of the Armenian genocide, and concluded in 2015 after producing two judgments, first by the Second Chamber, and then by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR. However, although they both found for the applicant, the two benches had very different lines of reasoning, and notably different conceptions regarding the relationship between law and history. I proceed by tracing the shifting status of ‘history’ and ‘historians’ in these two judgments, and paying attention to the deferrals, disclaimers and ellipses that structure law’s relation to history. This close reading offers the opportunity for a critical reappraisal of the relationship between law, denial and violence: I propose that the symbolic violence of the law operative in memory laws is a product of that which remains unresolved in law’s understanding of historicity (including its own), its self-understanding vis-à-vis the task of historiography, and its inability to respond to historical violence without inscribing itself into a history of violence, a process regarding which it remains in denial.