Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems

Abstract This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of 'policy horizons' that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems.     

A study on ten short tandem repeat systems: African immigrant and Spanish population data

This work presents the results obtained from a genetic–population study for the D1S1656 system in the population of Southwest Spain (Huelva, Cádiz and Sevilla), Spaniards of Caucasian origin from North Africa (Ceuta), as well as in the black Central West African and Moroccan immigrant populations in Spain. The results of a study of the autochtonous population of the Canary Islands (n=138), and immigrant Central West African populations in Spain (n=132), obtained for nine short tandem repeat (STR) loci (D3S1358, VWA, FGA, D8S1179, D21S11, D18S51, D5S818, D13S317, D7S820), as well as the amelogenin locus, all contained in Profiler Plus™ (Perkin-Elmer) PCR amplification kits, are also presented. Except for the FGA and VWA data on immigrant Central West African populations in Spain, no deviations from the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium were detected.     

Is the Median Voter a Clear-Cut Winner?: Comparing theMedian Voter Theory and Competing Theories in Explaining LocalGovernment Spending

This paper attempts to test the power of the median model againstthe respective strength of other alternate models based onredistributive, political-institutional and interest group theoriesin explaining the demand for public spending in New York statecounties during 1990, 1980 and 1970. To execute the comparison ofthe performance of median voter model with that of each of thenonmedian voter ones, various nonnested tests such as J and JAtests, N-tilde, W and encompassing tests have been employed.Results of the study show that although the median voter model hasa marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternativetheories, it may not be relied upon solely when many otherinstitutional, redistributive and interest group factors are alsorelevant for explaining public spending. The results of this studydiffer from those in Congleton and Bennett (1995). We do not findthat interest group models are substantially weaker than the medianvoter model.     

An assessment of the 2000 US presidential election: a set of political marketing guidelines

This paper comprises a set of marketing guidelines using the 2000 presidential election as an example, and analysing the image building of the two candidates, Al Gore and George W. Bush. It is not hard to understand, with hindsight, why Bush was the winner. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Ownership,empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion

Abstract This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid‐ and top‐level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show that disagreement among important and attentive proximate principals (mid‐level managers) expands discretion, but disagreement among important and attentive distant principals (top executives and politicians) reduces discretion. Sector has no direct or indirect effect on discretion. When customers or clients and peers are important and attentive principals, discretion increases, and so does productivity. Monitoring by mid‐level management has no effect on productivity. Because disagreement among distant principals is greater in the public sector, devolution of authority alone is unlikely to increase public sector productivity. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.