Performance regulation in a networked healthcare system: From cosmetic to institutionalized compliance

This article studies the role of a public regulator in managing the performance of healthcare professionals. It combines a networked governance perspective with responsive regulation theory to show the mechanisms that have added to significant changes in medical cost management in the Netherlands. In a five-year period, hospital practices transitioned from cosmetic compliance with performance regulation and strategic upcoding to institutionalized compliance more in line with regulatory goals. The article demonstrates how policy changes transformed incentive structures, introduced new forms of accountability, and added actors to the network with technocratic disciplining tasks. The networked character of performance regulation offered opportunities for a responsive, non-coercive regulatory strategy that engaged various actors in a regulatory conversation about strategic coding. Responsive regulation can reduce strategic responses to performance regulation and manage the gap between administrative and clinical logics. The case study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of responsive, non-punitive regulation in networked settings.     

A bit of basic,a bit of applied? R&D strategies and firm performance

The Journal of Technology Transfer - Most studies analysing the relationship between R&D and firm growth focus on total R&D investment. This paper aims to analyse separately each...     

Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom

Despite the important role that courts play to supervise the legality of regulatory agencies' actions, only few comparative studies analyze the contents of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions within European countries. This paper builds on the comparative administrative law scholarship and administrative capacities literature to analyze the content of 2,040 rulings against decisions issued by competition and telecommunications regulators in Spain and the United Kingdom. To understand the substance of the appeals, the study classifies cases according to the alleged administrative principles under breach and the regulatory capacities under challenge. Findings show a clear country-sector variation regarding the information contained in judicial disputes for both dimensions of analysis, which can be explained as a result of existing differences between the institutional settings of courts. These results offer a more in depth understanding of the political role of judicial oversight over regulatory agencies embedded in different institutional arrangements and policy sectors.     

The EU and the international socialization of gender equality: a case study of Tunisia’s AFTURD and Women and Citizenship (WAC)

The paper explores the impact of EU democracy promotion in the area of gender in Tunisia. It corroborates and adds nuance to the claim found in previous literature that the EU finances those CSOs whose leadership already embraces gender equality. It shows that members of these CSOs are socialized to different degrees and the internalization of gender equality differs depending on age, gender and location. Already socialized members increased their levels of attachment and investment. New CSO members differed in their socialization outcomes. Some undergo a full internalization process, others develop attachment to some features, while they reject those ideas that do not resonate in their value system. Findings also show that the EU successfully fosters local ownership in project management.     

Effects of Institutional Reforms on Women's Representation in Colombia, 1960–2014

Starting in the 1990s, reforms aimed at addressing the underrepresentation of women have been implemented in Colombia. However, research on the consequences of these reforms has been inconclusive. This article analyzes the influence of institutional variables on the proportion of nominated and elected women in Colombia between 1962 and 2014, at both the national and local levels of government, in three different institutional environments. Results confirm the influence of institutional change, indicating that decentralizing reforms and the introduction of the gender quota have had a positive impact on the proportion of women's candidacies and elections, but that the adoption of the open list negatively affected the percentage of elected women.     

Conceptualizing and Explaining Bureauphobia: Contours,Scope, and Determinants

Several studies have described a perspective among citizens that entails a negative image of public administration or civil servants that persists even after positive encounters and experiences. However, this ambivalent attitude has rarely been studied empirically. The authors refer to this attitude as “bureauphobia” and seek to enhance the existing literature through an analysis of its scope and root causes in Spain. The article analyzes two surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010, elaborating two alternative measures of bureauphobia. The results are similar regardless of the survey used and the specific operationalization of the concept: more than 20 percent of each sample exhibits a perspective that combines a negative image of public administration and satisfaction with its performance. A general attitude of distrust stands out among the variables associated with bureauphobia. Substantial regional variation is evident in the extent of the phenomenon.     

Political parties and corruption in Portugal

Portugal is often considered an example of successful democratic consolidation. Yet it has not been exempt from corruption scandals. By the mid‐1990s, transparency and the moralisation of political life had come to dominate parliamentary debates and reforms. The illegality surrounding party life must be seen against the background of dominant ethical standards in society. Voters appear tolerant of the unethical behaviour of political leaders, while parties are gradually becoming less responsive to their electorate. Representation and delegation rely more on tacit consent than on voice, thus encouraging complacency over corruption.