Federal contracts to perform analysis and management services: Can not-for-profits successfully compete?

This study uses a random sample of HUD contracts to determine if not-for-profit organisations have advantages or disadvantages in the competition for fedral procurement awards. Interest focuses on 228 competitors for awards selected in the sample. Differences between for-profit and not-for-profit groups are examined with respect to awareness of opportunity, willingness to compete, abiity to compete technically, and ability to be cost-competitive.

Generally, not-for-profit organizations compete well with for-profit ones in efforts to obtain awards to provide analysis and management services. Managers of not-for-profit organizations need not believe that their organizations are incapable of competting successfully against for-profit organizations.     

The most important question

Terrorism and the Liberal State, by Paul Wilkinson. London: Macmil‐lan, 1977, and New York: New York University Press, 1979.

The Weapons of Terror, by Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne. London: Macmillan, 1979.     

Intelligence Fiasco or Reasoned Accounting?: CIA Estimates of Soviet GNP

A leading specialist on Soviet economics examines the heavily politicized debate on the CIA's estimates of the rate of growth and comparative size of the Soviet economy during the period 1960-1985. The author finds little evidence to support the common indictment that the CIA seriously misestimated the Soviet growth record. He finds somewhat greater reason to believe that the Agency's comparative size ratios were overstated. And he finds grounds to question whether CIA dealt effectively with the limitations of the size and growth measures in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P27, P24, P52.     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”