Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions

This paper integrates twomodels of local government behavior,leviathan and fiscal illusion, into theframework of overlapping jurisdictions.Estimation of the leviathan and fiscalillusion variables without accounting forvertical effects between overlappingjurisdictions results in overestimation ofthe horizontal effects. Using a medianvoter model and municipal and county datawe find support for the leviathan modelusing traditional tests. These effects arelargely offset, however, when the test isset within the context of the verticalrelationship. We find that municipal percapita expenditures and county per capitaexpenditures are symmetricallycomplementary.     

Bolivia's soy complex: the development of ‘productive exclusion’

A significant transition is underway in Bolivia where both domestic and foreign capital are monopolizing commercial agriculture and leading a highly mechanized, capital-intensive production model which has considerably diminished the need for labour. This paper explores mechanisms and processes of ‘productive exclusion’ in the soy-producing zones of Santa Cruz in relation to the expansion, concentration and mechanization of the ‘soy complex’. We provide an analysis of how the agrarian structure has developed since soy was adopted – from ‘putting land into production’ to ‘expanding the agricultural frontier’ and ‘controlling the agro-industrial chain’. We explore how and the extent to which the penetration of new capital is leading to new processes of agrarian change which exclude the rural majority from accessing the means of production. While a process of ‘foreignization’ of land began to take shape in the early 1990s, new processes of capital accumulation are eroding the ability of small farmers to engage in productive activity, potentially leading to ‘surplus’ populations no longer needed for capital accumulation.     

Plain tales from the rice trade: Indications of vertical integration in foodgrain markets in Bangladesh

Through a series of case studies of the interactions between foodgrain traders and between traders and producers, this article questions the widespread belief that foodgrain markets in Bangladesh are characterised by low trading margins, no vertical integration and a general competitive health. The article indicates that merchant's capital plays two key roles in the market (i) in some areas of the country, the provision of merchant's credit deprives the poor producer of access to the market price for his or her output; (ii) working capital extended to subordinate traders may also enable a small group of large traders to influence prices. Further case studies of the interaction between traders and the state food distribution system indicate ways in which the private market may be able to frustrate or limit policies intended to regulate its operation. These insights suggest that the domination of merchant's capital may be one factor explaining low levels of productivity in the Bangladesh countryside. They also raise questions about the consequences of policies intended to increase the role of private trade in the economy.