Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993

When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.     

False Consciousness or Class Awareness? Local Income Inequality,Personal Economic Position,and Belief in American Meritocracy

Existing research analyzes the effects of cross‐national and temporal variation in income inequality on public opinion; however, research has failed to explore the impact of variation in inequality across citizens’ local residential context. This article analyzes the impact of local inequality on citizens’ belief in a core facet of the American ethos—meritocracy. We advance conditional effects hypotheses that collectively argue that the effect of residing in a high‐inequality context will be moderated by individual income. Utilizing national survey data, we demonstrate that residing in more unequal counties heightens rejection of meritocracy among low‐income residents and bolsters adherence among high‐income residents. In relatively equal counties, we find no significant differences between high‐ and low‐income citizens. We conclude by discussing the implications of class‐based polarization found in response to local inequality with respect to current debates over the consequences of income inequality for American democracy.