Local,National and Global Islam: Religious Guidance and European Muslim Public Opinion on Political Radicalism and Social Conservatism

The attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine and Kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, as well as the announcement of a ‘Caliphate’ by radical Islamists of the so-called ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) in 2014, reignited political and academic interest in the possible appeal of radical Islamism among young Muslims living in Western Europe. This analysis expands existing knowledge by adding a large-n, cross-national comparison to the small-n or single-case-study approaches dominating research on European Muslims over the last two decades. Moving beyond examination of the interaction between European governments and groups claiming to represent European Muslims, this analysis takes into account the individualisation of Muslim religious discourses, practices and identities. Binary logistic regression analyses challenge conventional wisdom which emphasises discrimination and rejection of Western foreign policies in the explanation of political radicalism. Instead, religious guidance and socio-economic status emerge as consistent correlates of political and social attitudes among West European Muslims. These findings not only add to a growing body of literature providing empirical evidence for the political impact of religious elites, they also have crucial policy implications for West European governments working to maintain national security and social cohesion.     

The Political Management of Pluralism

The problem for religion today is not that God is dead, but that there are too many gods. The focus, understandably, has been on the global increase of religious pluralism in the contemporary world. It is important to note, however, that there has been pluralism in earlier periods of history. The topic of this symposium is the exploration of such cases, both in the West and outside it.     

The struggle for press self-regulation in contemporary South Africa: Charting a course between an industry charade and a government doormat

Abstract

Self-regulation is widely seen as a way to balance media freedom with restraint. In South African press history, this balance has been the subject of contestation under apartheid. While the first 12 years after democracy were relatively uncontentious, concerns were raised in 2007 by proposals for statutory regulation proposals by the ruling party. The performance of the Press Council was an important component in the subsequent power-play around these proposals. This article assesses how independent performance of the system helped persuade the rulers to temporarily suspend their proposals and utilise the existing channels. However, the persistence of a narrow reactive practice of self-regulation provided space for the resumption of contestation in July 2010.     

The post-cold war predicament: A conclusion

The 1997 Asian economic crisis discredited the international discussion about ‘Asian values’ in Pacific Asia, replacing it with a globalised ‘good governance’ discourse. The financial breakdown undermined claims by Asian autocrats that government should be based on authoritarian ‘Asian values’, not ‘Western democracy’. Yet, seven years later, authoritarian regimes in the region are flourishing while the new democracies flounder. Why have dictatorships, not democracies, prospered politically since the Asian financial crisis? Pacific Asia began as an ‘imagined community’ of developmental dictatorships, making authoritarian development the ‘original position’ against which democratic governance is judged. While the demise of ‘Asian values’ contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, it did less harm to authoritarian regimes in more economically developed Malaysia and Singapore. The US‐led anti‐terror coalition provided several authoritarian rulers in Pacific Asia with welcome support from the West, while allowing them to weaken internal opposition. The new democracies, by contrast, faced international pressures to combat terrorism, often arousing local protest. Finally, middle class‐based reformist movements have risked destabilising the region's new democracies in the name of good governance.     

Unpacking Thailand's southern conflict: The poverty of structural explanations

Despite its importance and timeliness Peter Gowan's article “Triumphing toward International Disaster” falls short insofar as it fails to locate “American Grand Strategy” in the context of the global social relations of the capitalist order; particularly problematic is the way that he takes for granted the constitution of “global politics” as a system of nation-states. In our response we try to draw out some of the inconsistencies in Gowan's analysis by engaging the state-centeredness of his argument and discussing some of the implications of this for critical engagement with the changing world order and the current global crisis.     

Introduction

The idea of the Third World, which is usually traced to the late 1940s or early 1950s, was increasingly used to try and generate unity and support among an emergent group of nation-states whose governments were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. These leaders and governments sought to displace the ‘East–West’ conflict with the ‘North–South’ conflict. The rise of Third Worldism in the 1950s and 1960s was closely connected to a range of national liberation projects and specific forms of regionalism in the erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa, as well as the former mandates and new nation-states of the Middle East, and the ‘older’ nation-states of Latin America. Exponents of Third Worldism in this period linked it to national liberation and various forms of Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Americanism. The weakening or demise of the first generation of Third Worldist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with or was followed by the emergence of a second generation of Third Worldist regimes that articulated a more radical, explicitly socialist, vision. A moderate form of Third Worldism also became significant at the United Nations in the 1970s: it was centred on the call for a New International Economic Order (nieo). By the 1980s, however, Third Worldism had entered into a period of dramatic decline. With the end of the Cold War, some movements, governments and commentators have sought to reorient and revitalise the idea of a Third World, while others have argued that it has lost its relevance. This introductory article provides a critical overview of the history of Third Worldism, while clarifying both its constraints and its appeal. As a world-historical movement, Third Worldism (in both its first and second generation modalities) emerged out of the activities and ideas of anti-colonial nationalists and their efforts to mesh highly romanticised interpretations of pre-colonial traditions and cultures with the utopianism embodied by Marxism and socialism specifically, and ‘Western’ visions of modernisation and development more generally. Apart from the problems associated with combining these different strands, Third Worldism also went into decline because of the contradictions inherent in the process of decolonisation and in the new international politico-economic order, in the context of the changing character, and eventual end, of the global political economy of the Cold War.     

Review essay / defending sexual autonomy

Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, xii + 284 pp.     

Bone Mineral Density Adult Age Estimation in Forensic Anthropology: A Test of the DXAGE Application

Estimating age‐at‐death of individuals represented only by skeletonized human remains is a fundamental aspect of forensic anthropological casework. Recently, several researchers have proposed that bone mineral density (BMD) is a useful predictor of age‐at‐death in forensic contexts. Navega et al. (JFS 63(2):497–503) developed an online application called DXAGE for calculating age‐at‐death from BMD parameters. This study tests the utility of DXAGE by utilizing data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). BMD data from a female subsample (n = 470) of the NHANES 2007–2008 dataset were analyzed, and the relationship between predicted age and real age was examined. Inaccuracy was 14.25 years, and bias was ?7.20 years. Results show that there is a weak correlation between predicted and actual age (r = 0.47) using the DXAGE application. While BMD data are potentially useful for predicting age age‐at‐death, the DXAGE application should be used cautiously in forensic anthropological contexts.