Why noncompetitive states are so important for understanding the outcomes of competitive elections: the Electoral College 1868–2016

Brams and Kilgour (Public Choice 170:99–113, 2017) begin their recent essay on the Electoral College (EC) by pointing out the obvious, but nonetheless regularly neglected fact that noncompetitive states may have a decisive impact on EC outcomes and shape the electoral strategies of the candidates in the competitive states, especially if there is asymmetry in the partisan balances in the non-competitive states. Their contribution is to offer combinatorics insights into the implications of such asymmetries in the form of three new indicators: Winningness, Vulnerability, and Fragility. They then explore the magnitude and effects of these three measures for the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The major contribution of this note is to extend their analyses of these measures to an additional 34 elections: every election in the modern two-party post-Civil War era from 1868 to 2016. We find the Winningness measure to predict very well over the entire set of 38 presidential elections. Inspired by their work, we also offer a new and simpler metric for partisan asymmetries in noncompetitive states and show how it can predict the expected closeness of EC outcomes as well or better than the more complex combinatorics measures they propose.     

A taxonomy of runoff methods

We look at ways of classifying runoff methods in terms of characteristics such as number of rounds, rules used to determine which candidates advance to the next round, and rules which determine the final winner. We also compare runoffs and so-called instant runoffs such as the alternative vote.     

论合法性与政治协商

本文主要的意图是根据对卢梭、罗尔斯和西耶斯等理论的分析,探讨合法性基础的建构问题。作者认为,作为合法性基础的不是每个人的确定性意志,而是他们决定意志的过程,即政治协商的过程。虽然协商理论仅仅提供了一种不完善的、尽可能合理地做出决策的方式,但是,这种过程使理性结果的实现更加可能。     

Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones

Basic Downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two-candidate elections. Common journalistic wisdom, moreover, leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the US Congress disconfirms this prediction. To explain this counterintuitive result, we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office-seeking candidates, especially candidates in close elections, to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter.     

Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent

In The Calculus of Consent (1962: 235) Buchanan and Tullock assert: (1)?ceteris paribus, while a coalition controlling less than a majority of voters may control in either chamber, the greater the difference in the bases of representation in the two houses, the less likely is any given coalition of voters to control a majority of the seats in both chambers; (2)?the potential of cross-chamber logrolls (on issues of unequal intensity) increases the likelihood that a minority may effectively control policy making. We link these ideas to social theory approaches to bicameralism and for the empirical study of legislatures.     

Budgetary Reform in Haiti from 1996-98: A Case Study of Issues and Obstacles in Implementing Change

With the restoration of democracy and new lending agreements with the international community, the Haitian government embarked upon an ambitious program of budgetary reforms in 1996. For the next two years, Haiti's Ministry of Economy and Finance pursued administrative and legislative changes intended to address significant problems with the country's budget preparation and execution. This article examines the types of problems the Ministry faced and how it chose to address them. The author concludes that though the Ministry made important progress, the ultimate success of the reforms was impeded by weakness in the administrative capacity of the government and a persistent lack of clear political consensus and direction in the country.