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One paradox of voting states that, in a general election, in which many citizens vote, the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting. However, if all citizens accept this reasoning, then none will vote, and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome. Hence all should vote after all. The adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox: if each citizen adopts a certain (small) probability of voting, then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens' while to vote. A Nash equilibrium point thus occurs. Here we compute Nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting; for the more complicated case of composite voting (for example, as in a presidential election), we draw certain qualitative inferences. 相似文献
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We examine the factors that are associated with whether a bill passes the committee stage in the U.S. House of Representatives. Probit results for the 97th and 98th Congresses show that a bill is more likely to pass (1) if the sponsor chairs the committee that considers the bill or a subcommittee of that committee; (2) the higher the number of Democratic cosponsors who sit on the committee; (3) if the bill has bipartisan cosponsorship from members who sit on the committee that considers the bill. However, in the multivariate probit model including the above mentioned variables, other variables previously found to be important, e.g., the total number of cosponsors, whether or not the sponsor sits on the committee that considers the bill, and the party affiliation of the sponsor, are not statistically significant. Also a variable related to a public choice model of committee behavior, the difference between the sponsor's ideology (as measured by ADA score) and the ideology of the committee's median member, has no effect on a bill's probability of committee passage. 相似文献
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Are the rather generous welfare regimes found in most European countries sustainable; that is, are they competitive in a globalizing economy? Or will they, on the contrary, be crowded out by the more austere and less expensive regimes generally found in liberal Anglo‐Saxon countries? We first discuss this issue conceptually, focusing on the notions of institutional competitiveness, social investment, and short‐term and long‐term productivity. We then briefly present the results of an empirical study of 50 social indicators of policies and outcomes in 20 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries during the early 2000s. We conclude that welfare regimes have not been forced to converge through a “race to the bottom.” There remain three distinct ways to face the “trilemma” of job growth, income inequality, and fiscal restraint: Nordic countries achieve high labor market participation through high social investment; Anglo‐Saxon countries attain the same objective through minimal public intervention; while Continental European countries experience fiscal pressures because their social protection schemes are not promoting participation to the same extent. 相似文献