Territorial representation

Abstract This paper examines the opinion congruence of voters and representatives in European Parliament elections taking nation as the constituency of interest, an implied model of representation similar to that in a classic Miller and Stokes analysis. Congruence is greater for some countries than others. MEPs are even less representative of their voters than are candidates in general, and all are more pro–integrationist than the electorate. Differences between countries are explained by variations in electoral systems and in national party systems. A genuine European party system and a common and PR electoral system would make MEPs more representative, but almost certainly less integrationist.     

Territorial representation

This paper examines the opinion congruence of voters and representatives in European Parliament elections taking nation as the constituency of interest, an implied model of representation similar to that in a classic Miller and Stokes analysis. Congruence is greater for some countries than others. MEPs are even less representative of their voters than are candidates in general, and all are more pro–integrationist than the electorate. Differences between countries are explained by variations in electoral systems and in national party systems. A genuine European party system and a common and PR electoral system would make MEPs more representative, but almost certainly less integrationist.     

The Democratic Quality of Institutional Regimes: a Conceptual Framework

Lijphart's spectrum of democracies – recently expanded by Jack Nagel to a sub-majoritarian sphere of pluralitarian systems which use disproportional electoral systems in order to manufacture majority governments from minorities in the electorate – is based on only one dimension: inclusion of preferences. Political scientists in the Lijphartian tradition wrongly assume that inclusion of preferences, which is an input characteristic, automatically leads to responsiveness, which refers to actual policy decisions and hence is an output characteristic. We therefore add 'responsibility' as a second input characteristic and employ it alongside the inclusiveness of institutional regimes. We argue that in representative democracies there exists a trade-off between inclusiveness and responsibility. This trade-off helps us to measure the democratic quality of institutional regimes. The now expanded spectrum of democracies based on these two dimensions shows that majoritarian democracy proper – in which governments represent a majority of individual preferences but not more than necessary – is the best possible combination of the two democratic values.     

Keine einstweilige Verfügung zur Absicherung des Nichtleistungsrisikos

Der Anspruch auf Feststellung, nicht verpflichtet zu sein, eine vom Dienstgeber zugewiesene T?tigkeit verrichten zu müssen, kann nicht durch einstweilige Verfügung gesichert werden; die Leistung kann nur auf eigenes Prozessrisiko zurückgehalten werden, ohne die im Fall des Unterliegens eintretenden Verzugsfolgen durch einstweilige Verfügung absichern zu k?nnen.     

Interest organisation and intermediation in the New Länder

This article examines the formation of civil society in the new German Länder. In the case of the economic interest organisations (employers and industry associations and trade unions), the initiative came largely from the west. Although formal organisational structures were quickly put in place, levels of participation remained relatively low. The resultant weakness in terms of organisational resources perpetuates dependency upon counterparts in the west. A case study on the formation of environmental organisations in the east shows that the initial dynamism in this sector has given way to stagnation and fragmentation. This is symptomatic of the apparent inability of the new Länder to sustain the autonomous organisational activity normally associated with a pluralist civil society.     

Kein unumkehrbarer Zustand durch EV

Eine einstweilige Verfügung – auch eine solche nach § 381 Z 2 EO – kann immer nur eine vorl?ufige Regelung zum Gegenstand haben; sie darf keine Sachlage schaffen, die nicht mehr rückg?ngig gemacht werden kann.     

Bericht über die 32. Fachtagung der Gesellschaft für Umweltrecht

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