Sore Loser Laws and Congressional Polarization

To enhance explanations for party polarization in the U.S. Congress, we focus on an unappreciated legal structure known as the sore loser law. By restricting candidates who lose partisan primaries from subsequently appearing on the general election ballot as independents or as nominees of other parties, these laws give greater control over ballot access to the party bases, thus producing more extreme major party nominees. Using several different measures of candidate and legislator ideology, we find that sore loser laws account for as much as a tenth of the ideological divide between the major parties.     

Control,Historic Pitfalls,and the UK Nuclear Renaissance

In September 2015, the UK government announced that future taxpayers will underwrite the construction of two European-designed nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point in Somerset. Partly financed by Chinese utility companies, this announcement presents a fait accompli with little democratic input. Few, if any, historic lessons evident from previous attempts to manage its nuclear industry appear to have been learnt. This paper discusses the announcement with reference to the governance of the UK’s historic nuclear legacy—specifically dealing with control, stakeholder engagement, and transparency—and its implications for a nuclear renaissance.     

The role of credible commitments in state finance

Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue raises a host of important problems in the theory of the state. It provides an important step in the development of a theory that combines economic and political institutions into the same framework, potentially allowing scholars to address important issues such as the divergent economic paths taken by various states. It will therefore be an important book, and warrants attention. This approach holds much promise for the development of a theory of institutional development of the state from the middle ages onward.I have tried to sketch some additional directions for the theory to develop, pointing toward the answer of questions not directly faced by Levi — or for that matter, by much of the public choice literature: How do we explain the evolution of a predatory state into one with explicit limits on its powers? How do we explain the rise of representative institutions? Answering these questions often requires looking beyond the individual state to its international context. Competition among states, especially in the form of war, plays a key role here, and has two consequences. First, a major consequence of large-scale wars was fiscal stress. At such times, even a preditory state might agree to exchange limitations on its own powers for revenue. Second, the brief discussion of early modern Europe suggests that states with limited government might have had a financial advantage over those which were not so limited. The latter played a major role in the successful Dutch revolt against Spain and in the English defeat of France.     

Prospects for Distributive Justice Theory

Theoretical progress is essential to the viability of any scientific subdiscipline. Ever since a growth spurt in the 1980s, however, and despite a very active research enterprise, distributive justice theory has developed very little. Our approach is first to discuss the role that theory plays in disciplinary growth. After noting the indicators of stagnation in distributive justice areas, we identify key problems with the way distributive justice theories are constructed and evaluated. Specifically, little attention is paid to the clear definition and consistent use of theoretical terms, or to the construction of explicit logical arguments from which empirical hypotheses may be derived. Weaknesses in these areas all but prohibit the evolution of improved theories over time. We conclude with a set of evaluative criteria that, if applied collectively by members of the field, would optimize the chances for theoretical progress. Ultimately this also would lead to more efficient empirical tests and better-informed practical applications of distributive justice theories.     

The Economics of Science and Technology

This paper provides a non-technical, accessible introduction to various topics in the burgeoning literature on the economics of science and technology. This is an interdisciplinary literature, drawing on the work of scholars in the fields of economics, public policy, sociology and management. The aim of this paper is to foster a deeper appreciation of the economic importance of science and technology issues. We also hope to stimulate additional research on these topics.     

Exit, Loyalty, and Collective Action Among Workers in a Simulated Business Environment: Interactive Effects of Group Identification and Boundary Permeability

Past research on the effects of boundary permeability and tokenism (open boundaries with restricted access) suggests that when options for individual mobility exist, members of low status groups tend to exit their group and attempt to enter higher status groups. We hypothesized that the effects of boundary permeability on preferences for individual vs. collective action would depend upon prior levels of in-group identification, such that people who are more identified with their group would remain loyal and choose collective action, even under conditions of high boundary permeability. To test this hypothesis, a 2 (High vs. Low Group Identification) × 2 (High vs. Low Permeability) experimental design was employed to assess preferences for exit and loyalty in the context of a simulated business environment. For both rating measures and behavioral choices, the interaction hypothesis was supported. Implications for group loyalty and strategies of tokenism are discussed.