Corruption in public policy and its impact on development: The case of Uganda since 1979

This paper argues that corruption is a product of self-aggrandizement; of unrealistically low remuneration which makes it impossible for public servants to live within their legitimate means; and of a closed political system which inevitably tends to exclude aggregated interests'. Corruption leads to loss of much needed revenue and human talent for development, distorts priorities for public policy, and shifts scarce resources away from the public interest. The mutual distrust that results among the different sections of society, and the growth of despondency in the general public, are incompatible with the requirements for successful public policy. The main theme running through the paper is that political instability, corruption and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing. The paper finally outlines certain measures that need to be taken in order to clear the path for sustained growth and development.     

论刑法各论中的指使

指使部属违反职责罪、妨害作证罪、虐待被监管人罪以及破坏监管秩序罪,都使用了“指使”的概念,对此有三种解释语境,即完全承担共犯的责任、完全不承担刑事责任、部分承担刑事责任。只有综合考虑指使人和被指使人之间的关系、指使的强度、被指使人进行的活动,并且结合立法的意图,才能合理地分配指使人和被指使人的刑事责任。部分承担刑事责任的主张是正确的,指使表现为命令、胁迫和起主要作用的教唆。     

State crimes and state harms: a tale of two definitional frameworks

Criminologists have long debated the issue of how to define crime, and hence, the scope of criminological inquiry. For years, some critical criminologists have argued for expanded definitions of crime that include harmful behaviors of the state that may not be officially defined as criminal. Other critical criminologists have argued that existing legal frameworks may be used to study varieties of state crime, and that defining the harmful actions of the state as criminal is important to help mobilize public support for their control. In this paper, we first trace the historical development of these two perspectives, and then offer a tentative solution to the seeming tension between these two perspectives.     

Bureaupreneurs in China: we did it our way

This article explores the different and sometimes conflicting explanations of the success of the collective enterprises (town–village-enterprise) in China during the first phase of transition (1979–1995). It is argued that explanations, relying on cultural variables are not sustainable and this for two reasons. First, the importance of the collective enterprise is shrinking while the private sector is clearly on the rise. Second, other factors, referring to characteristics of the local and central political, administrative and economic environment, in which the Chinese enterprise has to (had to?) operate, provide for a sufficient explanation of the peculiar structure of the Chinese collective enterprises. These enterprises are seen as the result of ?bureau-preneurship’ because local bureaucrats were integrated in their management in order to pre-empt predatory behaviour and to facilitate the relationships with the central institutions. The article contributes to the property rights’ theory of the firm as it analyses an empirically very important case in which firms with unclear property rights and structures, apparently not conducive for incentives, might still be the most efficient option.     

诉权理论的批判与重构

诉权究竟是什么?本文从批判现有几大诉权学说的共同缺陷出发,通过考察诉权与法律的关系、诉权与审判权的关系和诉权的存在形式,提出诉权的人权权源论、诉权的利益保障价值论和诉权的运动状态论,力图从全新的视角探求诉权的本源。