At every scale from small committees to national elections, voters face tradeoffs between self-interest and the common good. We report three experiments in which participants vote for policies with real payoffs at stake. We manipulate self-interest by randomly assigning participants to two groups in society with different policy payoffs. Participants in the majority group are confronted by a simple choice between a policy that is better for themselves or a policy that is best for society. Overall, we find a clear effect of self-interest: Participants are more likely to choose the policy that earns them more money, compared to participants in the other group, even when the policy is detrimental to the common good. Simultaneously, we observe considerable levels of cooperative voting among participants in the majority, ranging from 47% to 79% across different payoff regimes. Finally, participants were not more cooperative when voting compared to when they chose between the same policies with a lottery or leader institution, departing from the hypothesis that voting institutions promote cooperative motives. We discuss implications for multiple literatures about voting behavior.
This special issue focuses on a variety of political-economy questions on trade and investment and is guided by a shared understanding that trade and investment processes can no longer be studied in isolation from each other. Three articles provide new insights into the study of the design of preferential trade agreements and effects thereof, two of which focus on the politically salient issues of non-trade concerns. A third one investigates which export sectors win from improved market access opportunities, in order words, how gains from trade are distributed. Two articles study the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system. One contribution is unpacking the role of the most important and influential firms and investors in affecting US behavior in WTO disputes, a second contribution studies how leadership changes in democracies and autocracies have different effects on dispute behavior. Finally, the special issue includes a new study on how the shadow economies in developing states are affected by the integration into the world economy (trade and investment) and by policy programs of the International Monetary Fund. 相似文献
Many corporations use legal rather than ethical standards for decision making in issues management. The Enron collapse provides a case example of why legal standards should never be used as a substitute for ethical principles. As we illustrate in this discussion of Enron, seeking loopholes in the law can lead to ethical violations that are ultimately more severe than legal infractions. We use systems theory and rhetorical rationales to discuss the issues management function as the proper location in an organization for ethical decision making and corporate responsibility. Both systems theory and rhetoric support the argument that an organization must be good internally and make decisions from an outside‐in perspective; management at Enron heeded neither idea. This research recommends a deontological approach, based on Kantian norms of moral autonomy and good intention as a basis for ethical issues management, and uses the Enron case for illustration of these principles. We conclude this discussion by offering a matrix simplifying the principles of both ethical and legal decision making based on systems theory and rhetorical approaches to public policy.
