Three types of price systems

Economic Change and Restructuring -     

Fairness in Non-human Primates?

Humans have a sense of fairness, i.e. an interest in the ideal of equity. This sense allows them to compare their own efforts and subsequent outcomes with those of others, and thus to evaluate and react to inequity. The question is whether our closest living relatives, the non-human primates, show the behavioural characteristics that might qualify as necessary components to a sense of fairness, such as inequity aversion. In this article, we review the five different experimental approaches to studying behaviours related to fairness in non-human primates, including their underlying logic and main findings that represent the current state of research in this field. In the critical condition of all these studies, a subject and a conspecific partner have either to invest different efforts or receive different outcomes while observing each other. The main question is whether??and how??subjects react to unequal situations that humans would perceive as ??unfair??. Taken together, the results from all five approaches provide only weak evidence for a sense of fairness in non-human primates. Although apes and monkeys are attentive to what the partner is getting, they do not seem to be able or motivated to compare their own efforts and outcomes with those of others at a human level. Even though the debate is still on-going, we believe that a full sense of fairness is not essential for cooperation. Obviously, apes and monkeys are capable of solving problems cooperatively, without a strong, humanlike sense of fairness. They are mainly interested in maximizing their own benefit, regardless of what others may receive. It is thus possible that a sense of fairness only exists rudimentarily in non-human primates.     

Future generations as rightholders

Many people believe that we have obligations with respect to future generations concerning the state of the environment that we pass on to them. Apart from the practical problem of people not really acting on such beliefs, there are also conceptual or philosophical issues that make these obligations problematic. The so-called non-identity problem is especially difficult: depending on which courses of action we adopt, different people will be born in the future, which means that even future people who due to our behavior will live under fairly poor circumstances might not have any ground for complaint. Had we not behaved as we did, they would not even have existed. It is argued here that, at least within a rights-theoretical approach, the non-identity problem can be solved by moving from considering individual rights to generational rights, rights which future generations hold qua generations.     

Is Personal Vote‐Seeking Behavior Effective?

Does representatives' legislative activity have any effect on their electoral performance? A broad theoretical literature suggests so, but real‐world evidence is scarce as empirically, personal and party votes are hard to separate. In this article, we examine whether bill initiation actually helps MPs to attract preference votes under flexible list electoral systems. In these systems, voters can accept the party‐provided rank order or vote for specific candidates, which allows a clear distinction between personal and party votes. The empirical analysis uses data on bill initiation by Belgian MPs in the period 2003–2007 to explain their personal vote in the 2007 elections. We find that particularly single‐authored proposals initiated shortly before the upcoming elections are associated with a larger personal vote.     

A partisan model of government expenditure

Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors' preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties' spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.     

Mehr Normativität wagen: Ein Plädoyer für eine reflexive Grundhaltung in der politikwissenschaftlichen Lehre

This article argues for a more conscious reference to normativity in political science education. A greater reference to normativity should find its expression in a self-reflexive attitude which includes a disclosure of own normative assumptions, an examination of given postulates and knowledge and a recognition of the complexity of social relations. By looking at students, teachers and learning relations, we show how such a reflexive attitude can be implemented and facilitated in order to educate students who think and act critically.     

Der Einfluss von Koalitionsaussagen,programmatischen Standpunkten und der Bundespolitik auf die Regierungsbildung in den deutschen Ländern

Party politics at the German state level plays a decisive role for patterns of party competition and for legislative decision-making at the federal level. This article analyses the impact of party politics at the state and the federal level on the formation of coalition governments in the German Laender. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that covers information on the state parties’ programmatic positions, their pre-electoral alliances, and the structure of party competition on the federal level in the time period between 1990 and 2007. The results reveal that the programmatic positions of state parties have a decisive impact on government formation. Other relevant factors are the parties’ relative strength, their coalition preferences and the partisan composition of government and opposition on the federal level.