Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties

Abstract. This article analyzes party responses to European integration in Finland andSweden.We argue that such responses are shaped by seven explanatory factors: basic ideology, public opinion, factionalism, leadership influence, party competition, transnational links, and the development of integration. Each factor can lead to a positive or a negative evaluation of the European Union. In the empirical analysis, the sample includes all parties represented in the respective national parliaments, and the research material consists of party documents, parliamentary votes, statements by leading party figures, public opinion surveys, direct observation and interviews. Party competition and leadership influence are the strongest factors in the Finnish case, while public opinion and factionalism are the strongest factors in Sweden. Issue avoidance combined with the secondary importance of the EU in party politics explain why parties have been relatively successful in containing internal factionalism and discord, especially in Finland.     

The role of the state in a technological society†

Abstract. Society demands ever-increasing interventions by the state. At the local level the demand for increased state activity is caused by the complexity of modem society and by the increased concentrations of people being experienced, and even the most traditional areas of government service will expand. Provincial and federal governments will find their increased activity revolving around education and the manipulation of the economy. People do not want the government to do anything more, and are distrustful of government activity. They have those feelings for good cause. Some of the things government attempts to do it does incompetently (and I digress to bad-mouth Opportunities for Youth, unemployment insurance, and municipal transportation). On the other hand, some of those things that government does do well, like creating unemployment and providing public housing, it does on such a scale that people are badly hurt by the results. Society is making many rapid changes. Society does that for itself; the government does not do it. The job of government is to assess and respond to those changes. It ought not to initiate them. as it is incapable of doing so. The political process only works kvell with present public concerns. The greatest dangers to society are posed by the tendency of government to act without political control or direction. This danger is accentuated by an out-of-date political structure, placing powers and responsibilities in the hands of governments that are beyond any practical political control. There is a dilemma. People want and need more government services and do not trust government to provide them. The solution must be found in a radical restructuring of levels of government (I indulge in the pleasant fantasy of contemplating the abolition of Ottawa), and in the strengthening of communities, primarily through organizers. Sommaire. La société exige de l'état des interventions toujours plus fréquentes. Au niveau régional, le besoin d'unr participation plus importante de l'état est dûà la complexité. de la société rnoderne et à la concentration toujours plus grande de la population, de manière que même les services gouvernementaux les plus routiniers y prendront de l'expansion. Les gouvernements provinciaux et fédéral borneront généralement leurs Iiouvelles activités au domaine de l'enseignement et à la manipulation de l'économie. La population voudrait mettre fin aux ingérences dun gouvernement dont elle craint les activités, et pour causc: ! Certaines tentatives du gouvernement ont été entreprises sans compétence (je songe é l'échec du programme Jeunesse, à l'assurance chômage et aux systèmes de transport municipaux). Par ailleurs, ce que le gouvemement fait le mieux (propager le chômage et multiplier les habitations à loyer modéré) il le fait sur une telle envergure que toute la population finit par en soufh-ir. La société subit des changements nombreux et rapides, changements qu'elle accomplit elle-même, sans l'aide du gouvernement. Le rôle du gouvernement est d'évaluer ces changements et d'agir en conséquence. Ce n'est pas à lui d'en prendre l'initiative, d'autant plus qu'il en est incapable. Le processus politique ne peut s'attaquer efficacement qu'aux difficultés existantes. Les plus grands dangers qui confrontent la société proviennent de la tendance gouvernementale à agir sans contrôle ni modération. Ce danger se trouve encore aggravé par un système politique périmé qui abandonne le pouvoir et les responsabilités à des formes de gouvernements soustraits à tout contrble politique pratique. Le probléme est sérieux: la population, qui a besoin de services gouvernementaw plus étendus, ne peut se fier à lui pour les procurer. La solution ne viendra donc que d'une restructuration radicale de tous les niveaux du gouvernement (il m'arrive de rêver de l'abolition totale d'Ottawa) et d'un renforcement des pouvoirs municipaux aux mains d'organisateurs compétents.     

Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001

This paper provides the most comprehensive and extensive analysis to date of the possibility of a "rally 'round the flag" effect—an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international conflict—in Britain, for the years 1948–2001. We use a fractionally integrated time series model with an array of political and economic controls. Our primary dependent variable is intention to vote for the ruling party. The results confirm earlier studies that the Falklands War generated a rally effect, but they provide a more sophisticated understanding of the Gulf War rally. New results also include the findings that participation in international crises which stopped short of war did not engender rallies, and that there were no rallies for the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo Wars. The findings indicate that when they do occur rallies are heterogeneous in nature, that rallies are most likely when there is intense and direct threat to the national interest, that the relationship between multilateralism and rallies in the British case is tenuous, and that rallies for the ruling party are sometimes expressed through satisfaction with the prime minister.     

Leadership and Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations

Economic theories of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have modified standard economic assumptions to explain altruism and nonprofit entrepreneurship but have neglected their dependence on leadership due to the traditional reluctance of economists to consider phenomena associated with preference change. The relevance of Hermalin's (1998 ) model of leadership by example and Casson's (1991 ) theory of leadership through moral manipulation are considered within an NPO context where leaders seek to influence stakeholder commitments to the organization's quest. The propositions Elster (1998 ) advanced with regard to the relationship between the emotions and decision making are then applied in a theory that explains how NPO leaders can develop a culture of hope that maintains the quality control and product differentiation advantages claimed for these organizations. It is argued that policymakers should consider the dependence of NPOs on the quality of leadership when choosing the organizational mechanism for social service delivery.