An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, 2012) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing hypotheses in a two-dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our primary results suggest: (1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, (2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and (3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game.     

Risk Attitudes and the Incumbency Advantage

Explanations for the incumbency advantage in American elections have typically pointed to the institutional advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers but overlook the role of individual traits that reinforce this bias. The institutional advantages enjoyed by incumbents give voters more certainty about who incumbents are and what they might do when (and if) they assume office. We argue that these institutional advantages make incumbents particularly attractive to risk-averse individuals, who shy away from uncertainty and embrace choices that provide more certainty. Using data from 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show that citizens who are more risk averse are more likely to support incumbent candidates, while citizens who are more risk accepting are more likely to vote for challengers. The foundations of the incumbency advantage, we find, lie not only in the institutional perks of office but also in the individual minds of voters.     

More on Measuring Two-Party Competition: A Response to Dunleavy

Gaines and Taagepera [(2013) How to operationalize two-partyness. Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties, 23(4), pp. 387–404] propose two indices of two-party competition for district-level data, both of which are alleged to be flawed. The case against them rests mainly on whether or not elections with one dominant party should be regarded as exhibiting one- or two-way competition. For those inclined to see 90–10% and 50–50% outcomes are different in kind, our indices can provide better measures than the popular effective number of parties or the “gap”. We agree that assessment of a set of outcomes, in a given election or over time, requires careful attention to the important distinction between micro-level data and aggregate measures.     

The Guardian and Press Reform: a Wheel Come Full Circle

In the decade 2008–18, between the eruption of the phone hacking scandal and the cancellation of part two of the Leveson Inquiry, the editorial position of The Guardian on press regulation went from indifference to demanding wholesale reform, and then back to indifference and even active opposition to change. Inevitably, this entailed reversals and contradictions, yet these were not acknowledged to the newspaper’s readers, who are left with a misleading impression of continuity. This study, by an academic and journalist who campaigned for regulatory reform throughout this period, aims to shed light on The Guardian’s 360‐degree progression by reference to its editorials and other published statements.     

Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Mind the Gap: Attitudes about Miranda Warnings among Police Chiefs and Citizens

Research shows that the police subculture can be characterized by a distinct set of values and beliefs. Much of the police subculture research has focused on common characteristics and values found among a sample of police officers. Fewer studies have considered how the police, as a group, are similar to citizens. In this study, attention is given to similarities and differences in how the police and the public perceive the Miranda warnings. Attention is also given to whether type of neighborhood (low crime versus high crime) is related to attitudes about the Miranda warnings. Findings suggest that while the warnings are perceived in different ways there are similarities that could bridge the gap between the police and public. Implications are suggested.     

Ten Years On, the ‘Three Circle’ Model of Restorative & Transformative Justice: A Tool to Combat Victimization and Recidivism

This paper had its genesis 10 years ago in the authors’ development of a communitarian ‘three circle’ model of restorative and transformative justice for a pilot restorative justice study used with serious and repeat adult offenders appearing in the Magistrates’ Courts in Western Australia. The model was designed in part to place their crimes within a context, something that rarely occurs within the mainstream adversarial criminal justice system in Australia. The model was primarily designed to provide victims of crime with the best outcome and offenders with the opportunity to provide apology and restitution, as well as take responsibility for their actions. The three circles, each including two facilitators, are: Circle 1: consists of the perpetrator who has pleaded guilty to a specified criminal act together with his/her family and/or friends; Circle 2: consists of the victim(s) of the crime together with their family and/or friends. Circle 3: consists of a combination of the first two circles, tasked to seek, if possible, a mutually agreeable resolution that culminates in a report to present to the Magistrate in court to use in mitigation of sentencing. Importantly, although the 30-month study had socially and economically significant results, 10 years after its completion there is still no restorative justice program in the adult courts in Western Australia. Because of this, the authors also set out to question the state government’s motivation in largely ignoring this successful process.