Political Institutions and Conservation Outcomes: Wildlife Policy in Zambia

“Messy” democratic political institutions might generate ineffective conservation policy watered down by competing interest groups and rival political parties. A hardcore environmentalist may believe that a pro‐conservation dictatorship would be the type government best able to meet her goals. Such an environmental fantasy became reality in Zambia under President (1972‐1991) Kenneth Kaunda. But despite his dictatorial powers, he did not have much success in curbing the poaching epidemic that swept through Zambia in the 1970s and 80s. The structure of the one‐party state, together with a fall in the price of Zambia's principal export (copper) and a concomitant increase in the value of many wildlife products, created an environment that generated incentives for politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to disregard Kaunda. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom about the politics of one‐party states. It shows that even in the case of one‐party government, the structure of political institutions remains critical to the extent of a dictator's control.     

Political Manipulation Or Feedback In English Local Authorities’ Standard Spending Assessments? The Case Of The Abolition Of The Inner London Education Authority

The focus of attention in this article is on the major shift in Education Standard Spending Assessments, and with it central grants, in favour of Inner London which first took place in 1990, and has persisted since then. This coincided both with the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority and the transfer of education responsibilities to the Inner London Boroughs, and the introduction of the poll tax. The objective of this article is to test whether this shift in favour of Inner London was due to political manipulation or, instead, was another example of the long-established technical characteristic of 'feedback' in spending needs assessments in the English local finance system. A test is devised which distinguishes between these two explanations and involves the use of an Inner London dummy variable. The results provide strong evidence of political manipulation. The implications of this finding are considered.     

The scope and limits of financial liberalisation in developing countries: A critical survey

This article reviews the growing literature on financial reform in developing countries. We draw both on the theoretical contributions outlining the case for and against liberalisation as well as on the experience of many developing countries with liberalisation. We argue that the existence of market failures in financial markets hampers the liberalisation process and indeed suggests that the simple liberalising strategy envisaged in much of the literature is inappropriate. We argue instead for an alternative strategy which integrates some aspects of liberalisation with the development of appropriate financial institutions designed to serve best the needs of the real economy.