Standing Tiebout on his Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments

Unlike other governmental units, statelottery agencies publicly acknowledge thattheir primary objective is revenuemaximization. This claim and the inherentmonopoly power of lottery agencies providesa unique arena to test for Leviathan. Withdata obtained from United States' lotterygames, I perform a Laffer curve analysis toderive the optimal lottery tax rates fordifferent categories of games. Theseoptimal tax rates and Monte Carlosimulations are then used to test whetherthe current tax structure of lottery gamesis indeed the revenue maximizing structure. I find strong empirical evidence for the``Leviathan Lottery''.     

Risk Clusters,Hotspots, and Spatial Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as an Algorithm for Police Resource Allocation Strategies

The study reported here follows the suggestion by Caplan et al. (Justice Q, 2010) that risk terrain modeling (RTM) be developed by doing more work to elaborate, operationalize, and test variables that would provide added value to its application in police operations. Building on the ideas presented by Caplan et al., we address three important issues related to RTM that sets it apart from current approaches to spatial crime analysis. First, we address the selection criteria used in determining which risk layers to include in risk terrain models. Second, we compare the “best model” risk terrain derived from our analysis to the traditional hotspot density mapping technique by considering both the statistical power and overall usefulness of each approach. Third, we test for “risk clusters” in risk terrain maps to determine how they can be used to target police resources in a way that improves upon the current practice of using density maps of past crime in determining future locations of crime occurrence. This paper concludes with an in depth exploration of how one might develop strategies for incorporating risk terrains into police decision-making. RTM can be developed to the point where it may be more readily adopted by police crime analysts and enable police to be more effectively proactive and identify areas with the greatest probability of becoming locations for crime in the future. The targeting of police interventions that emerges would be based on a sound understanding of geographic attributes and qualities of space that connect to crime outcomes and would not be the result of identifying individuals from specific groups or characteristics of people as likely candidates for crime, a tactic that has led police agencies to be accused of profiling. In addition, place-based interventions may offer a more efficient method of impacting crime than efforts focused on individuals.     

Detection of drugs using XAD-2 resin. III:A routine screening procedure for bile

The ability of bile to concentrate drugs and metabolites coupled with its general availability make it suitable for analysis and often the fluid of choice in postmorten cases requiring drug screening. Bile (5 to 10 ml) was diluted with water, sulfuric acid was added, and the mixture was autoclaved. The precipitated bile salts were easily removed by filtration and the filtrate (pH adjusted to 8.0 to 8.5) extracted with XAD-2 resin. Drugs were eluted with a mixture of ethyl acetate/1,2-dichloroethane and analyzed with thin-layer chromatography. Varying the dilution of bile improved the recovery of morphine, codeine, methadone, amobarbital, and phenobarbital. Excessive dilution, however, caused a washing phenomenon and reduced recovery of some drugs, as shown with morphine and codeine. The procedure described is useful for the rapid screening of bile specimens for drugs.     

Persuasion, slack, and traps: how can economists change the world?

Contrary to my critics, voter irrationality does not imply that economists cannot mitigate political failure. With rational voters, reform-minded economists have few viable tactics; with irrational voters reformers have more options. Rational voters can be swayed only by facts and logic; irrational voters could respond to better rhetoric. Rational voters strategically punish those who ignore their policy preferences; irrational voters use less effective disciplinary strategies that create political slack. Even with irrational voters, efficiency-enhancing reform is hard. With rational voters, however, democracy’s failure to adopt a reform is strong evidence that the reform does not enhance efficiency.