The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change

The requirements of the U.S. Constitution are often assumedto be either clear or defined by the judiciary through interpretation,or both. Examination of the nullification crisis of 1833 indicatesthat this view of the U.S. Constitution is misleading. The nullificationcrisis provoked three competing visions of the appropriate understandingof federalism in the context of textual ambiguity and judicialactivity. The subsequent development of federalism was determinedby that political conflict and compromise. The nullificationcontroversy provides an important example of the openness ofconstitutional norms, the significance of political debate inthe shaping of constitutional meaning, and the complexity ofantebellum political thought.     

Pigou, Coase, common law, and environmental policy: Implications of the calculation debate

The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third-party calculation. The calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common-law arrangements than under administrative processes. The primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches.     

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS

Abstract: Traditionally public policy analysis has been able to employ the conceptual framework offered by the theory of market failure in order to evaluate the efficiency of market outcomes. However, until fairly recently, no corresponding analytical structure existed which could facilitate the examination of the efficiency and equity characteristics of government or non-market outcomes. Quite apart from public choice theory, an embryonic normative theory of government failure has now been developed which can act as a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present, three theories of government failure coexist in the literature: Wolf's theory of non-market failure; Le Grand's theory of government failure; and Vining and Weimer's theory of govern- ment production failure. These models form the basis for a more universal theory of government failure. Nevertheless, in its current state of development this seminal literature can still assist in rational public policy design subject to certain caveats. Foremost amongst these is the need for policy analysts to augment the efficiency and equity criteria with some additional broader normative measures, and the necessity for care to be taken in the use of allocative efficiency as a benchmark in non-market circumstances.