A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and thereby created the basis of a global counterterrorism system. At the heart of this system lies a partnership between the Security Council and the UN member states—a partnership in which states have been given considerable, independent, operational responsibility. Unfortunately, this system has often been criticized and viewed pessimistically by scholars, who tend to focus primarily on UN bodies and offer little discussion of the key role of states. This article presents a different conceptualization of this counterterrorism system and suggests, through case studies, that it has attained some important objectives in the global struggle against terrorism.     

A theory of executive dominance of congressional politics: the committee system in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article analyses the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies committee system using rational choice theories developed originally for the US Congress. We suggest that pure versions of these theories are unable to explain Brazilian committee politics, and point out the necessity of building a specific theory that takes into account key institutional characteristics which give the Brazilian Executive considerable power to control the legislative process to assure outcomes consistent with presidential preferences. We demonstrate that committees in Brazil operate to some degree as agents of the executive. For this reason, we call it the Theory of Executive Dominance.