Validation of the MiniFiler™ Kit in archaeological samples

We evaluate the usefulness of MiniFiler™ Kit in the field of ancient DNA. A set of samples belonging to different locations from Iberian Peninsula, with ages ranging from Neolithic to XVII century, was tested. Results could be replicated in only one burial site, probably due to the taphonomic conditions. Other cases could only produce partial or none genetic profiles.     

Logique sans vérité

Sans résumé     

Rebuilding Utopia? Critical criminology and the difficult road of reconstruction in Latin America

This contribution assesses the developmentof criminology, during the last few decades, and contemplates the future course of critical criminology in view of developments in current capitalism, and their impact on ``Third World' societies (Latin America in particular).     

Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil's Multiparty Presidential Regime

When delegating governing tasks to a coalition partner, the president would like to give a minister ample administrative powers to be able to effectively accomplish the political mission. Due to information asymmetries, the president runs the risk that this discretion might be used to pursue policy outcomes that may harm the president's preferences. This trade‐off between delegation and control is key to understanding governance strategies the president chooses to minimize agency risks and coordinate public policies. With Brazil as a case study, this article demonstrates that presidents have strategically made frequent use of junior ministers as watchdogs of coalition partners, especially when coalition allies are ideologically distant from the president's preferences. Yet neither the portfolio salience nor the president's decision to share powers with coalition partners proportionally seems to interfere in such strategic decisions.     

Two Roles for Elections: Disciplining the Incumbent and Selecting a Competent Candidate

This paper presents a political economy model in which the voterswant to control moral hazard on the part of the incumbent andselect a competent candidate to be in office. We focus on electionswhich take place repeatedly as the basic disciplinary and screeningmechanism. It is shown that incomplete information of the votersabout the (economic) competence of the incumbent helps to overcomethe lame duck effect of a government with foreseeable end. Asecond finding is that economic performance strongly influences thereelection of the incumbent. In particular, in (stationary perfectBayesian) equilibrium, if economic performance is bad, theincumbent will not be reelected. We also prove that having thepossibility of reelecting a government increases the welfare of thevoters to the no reelection benchmark.     

House organ

“A vast, depopulated coutry; a low density of automobiles, which are propelled by a type of gas with little sulphur; windy cities with no thermal inversions; a fairly recent genocide of dissident intellectuals and political activists; an even more recent economic collapse; a fragmented and quarrelsome left; a current government economic policy which assures stability at the price of decreased wagest less job security and increased unemployment — all these ingredients serve to suggest that red-green politics are not exactly booming in Argentina.“