Two dimensions of democracy and the economy

Does democracy influence economic policymaking and outcomes? Our study investigates the implications of Dahl's two dimensions of democracy (‘polyarchy’): contestation/competition and inclusion/participation. We hypothesize that increases in democratic competition inspire policy incrementalism, thus lowering growth volatility and generating fewer deep crises. Meanwhile, increases in substantive democratic inclusion – genuine political voice, or democratic participation in the presence of a minimum of contestation – should increase the political weight of relatively poor voters, who have a differentially strong aversion to deep growth crises. A statistical analysis of 149 countries for 1961–98 finds greater democracy associated with fewer years of sharply negative growth (‘crisis’), with both democratic contestation and substantive inclusion contributing to this outcome. Our conclusions question the wisdom of designing economic policy institutions that are intentionally insulated from the democratic process.     

Responding to democratic decay and crises of governance: The European Union and the convention of Cotonou

The co-operation framework adopted in 2000 between the European Union and 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) identifies political dialogue and governance conditionality as the core strategies for promoting democracy and anchoring the rule of law in developing countries. However, the mechanisms for suspending aid on political grounds, originally introduced in 1995, remain largely understudied and unevaluated. This article sets out to review the policies and strategies of the European Community aimed at responding to the crises of governance and preventing conflict. It explores the difficult combination of democracy assistance and governance conditionality to prevent democratic regression in politically fragile countries by reviewing the European Community's response to crises of governance in Niger, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire and Fiji. It argues that, although offering appropriate responses to abrupt interruptions in democratization processes, traditional forms of political conditionality have proved largely inadequate for responding to the gradual corrosion of governance and the decay of democracy. Furthermore, conducting structured political dialogue puts further demands on the management of aid, as it converts foreign aid into a highly political endeavour. This article concludes with a set of proposals for enhancing the political coherence of EC political dialogue and governance conditionality.     

Why is Poverty So High Among Afro-Brazilians? A Decomposition Analysis of the Racial Poverty Gap

This study aimed to identify the major factors underlying the discrepancy in poverty levels between whites and blacks in Brazil. An Oaxaca–Blinder-type decomposition was performed in order to quantify the extent to which differences in observed characteristics (characteristics effect) account for this difference. The remaining unexplained part (coefficients effect) provides evidence on how these characteristics are differentially associated with the risk of poverty in each group. Our results show that the characteristics effect explains a large part of the discrepancy in poverty levels: education and labour variables explain one-half of the gap, and geographic and sociodemographic variables another two-fifths.     

Long-term effects of participation in the Baltimore City drug treatment court: Results from an experimental study

This study uses an experimental design comparing 235 offenders assigned either to drug treatment court or treatment as usual. It extends prior analyses of this study sample to examine whether differences observed between drug treatment court subjects and control subjects at one and two years after the start of the program persist after three years, when many of the subjects had ceased active treatment. Further, it extends earlier analyses that showed that the quantity of drug treatment court services received was related to lower recidivism rates by using an instrumental variables approach to handle the endogeneity problem that sometimes arises when subjects self-select into different levels of service. Results show a sustained treatment effect on recidivism, controlling for time at risk. This effect is not limited to the period during which services are delivered. Rather, it persists even after participation in the drug court program ceases. Results also show that the recidivism is lowest among subjects who participate at higher levels in certified drug treatment, status hearings, and drug testing. These positive findings are tempered with findings that more than three-fourths of clients are re-arrested within three years, regardless of participation in the drug treatment court, and that drug treatment court cases spend approximately the same number of days incarcerated as do control cases. Implications for strengthening drug treatment courts are discussed.     

Argentina,a 'Parasite State' on the Verge of Disintegration

Argentina has more than twice the total debt of India whilst the latter has 28 times more population in roughly equivalent territories. According to Poder Ciudadano, a local NGO, in 1999 Argentine political parties spent 440 times more than those of Chile. These gross asymmetries help to show that Argentina's financial troubles must be attributed to her own political practices rather than to adverse circumstances or foreign scapegoats. By December 2001, overspending had manifestly destroyed the Argentine financial system. Across-the-board violations of property rights followed, through bank withdrawal restrictions and a debt default that was the biggest in world economic history. This paper analyses the breakdown of federal institutions, the atomisation of power and the erosion of governability that ensued as a consequence of the financial crisis. Mafia-style political practices, an endemic evil in the background of Argentine politics, jumped to the forefront as a consequence of this institutional breakdown.     

The role of 'the resources of the power hypothesis' in explaining the Spanish welfare state between 1975–1995

There are two clearly differentiated parts to this work. The first consists of a review of the theoretical arguments that underlie the so–called 'resources of power hypothesis' . That theory has been used to explain the growth and development of the Welfare State in several European countries. The findings of a number of empirical works backing up that theory have also been included in this review. The intention of the second part is to check the theory against the Spanish case between 1975 and 1995. The conclusion of this work is that if, besides considering the ideological persuasion of the party controlling the government, we take into account the other relevant factors encompassed by the theory, then the 'resources of power hypothesis' is valid in explaining and interpreting the make–up and scope of the Spanish Welfare State.     

A theory of executive dominance of congressional politics: the committee system in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article analyses the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies committee system using rational choice theories developed originally for the US Congress. We suggest that pure versions of these theories are unable to explain Brazilian committee politics, and point out the necessity of building a specific theory that takes into account key institutional characteristics which give the Brazilian Executive considerable power to control the legislative process to assure outcomes consistent with presidential preferences. We demonstrate that committees in Brazil operate to some degree as agents of the executive. For this reason, we call it the Theory of Executive Dominance.     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.     

Moderating Factors in Adopting Local e-Government in Spain

This study analyses the factors that influence citizens' intention to use e-government activities offered by municipalities in Spain. For this purpose, we developed a straightforward user behaviour model that considers the components of the TAM and DOI models simultaneously, harnessing their synergies and factoring in the role of citizens' trust. We also examined the moderating role that population size can play in the model's behaviour. Among the results we obtained, it is important to note that user trust not only improved the model's fit, but also showed a significant effect on intention of use for all the population sizes that we analysed. The other significant relationship for all the samples linked ease of use to perceived usefulness. For the other relationships between variables, we observed the moderating role of size for the populations we considered.