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81.
This article examines the impact of policies and programs that have expanded immigration enforcement from the federal to the local level. Drawing from in‐depth interviews with over sixty individuals who are members of undocumented or mixed‐status families, I discuss how these initiatives have extended the geography of deportability from traditional sites that focus explicitly on immigration enforcement (e.g., the US–Mexico border) to more nontraditional sites in the public sphere (e.g., driving under the influence checkpoints or grocery stores). I demonstrate how this intensification of enforcement strains undocumented immigrants’ resources as well as their participation in school, work, and their communities.  相似文献   
82.
In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We theorize that, in the shadow of the global norm for CBI, the increasing distance in preferences between the government and the central bank, and the procedural hurdles to change the status quo, explain the intensity of challenges to the delegation contract or the delegated agent. An analysis of the frequency of irregular central bank leadership replacements, and instances of politicization and de-delegation show the plausibility of our argument. We also show that, in Latin America, reforms de-delegating monetary policy have been small, balancing the needs that justified delegation in the first place, but rolling back the most stringent constraints placed on financing the government.  相似文献   
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