The coastal zone as an administrative entity for governing U.S. marine minerals development

The coastal zone is being promoted as a spatial unit to coordinate and administer offshore minerals development with other coastal uses. Rather than aiding the administration of minerals development , the coastal zone is being used as the reason to block such development. This paper explores the coastal zone concept as an entity for administration. It concludes that just because minerals may be found in a coastal zone does not mean that physical entity is the most appropriate vehicle for administering mineral development. Arbitrariness at to what is included or excluded from a coastal zone as well as many minerals impacts being found outside of the coastal zone militate against such an entity being the sole criterion for decisionmaking. While the coastal zone may be appropriate for some mineral decisions, the choice to implement it must be arrayed against alternative criteria to ensure a high degree of effectiveness and efficiency in those decisions.     

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether government size is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 countries. We thus provide a test of the longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical economic theory and public choice theory. According to the neoclassical view, governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals' quality of life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming their citizens' quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government consumption. For low, middle income, and male people, this result is stronger when the government is leftwing, while government consumption appears to be less harmful for women when the government is perceived to be effective. Government capital formation and social spending have no significant impact on life satisfaction.     

Public–Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review

Public–private partnerships are enjoying a global resurgence in popularity, but there is still much confusion around notions of partnership, what can be learned from our history with partnerships, and what is new about the partnership forms that are in vogue today. Looking at one particular family of public–private partnerships, the long-term infrastructure contract, this article argues that evaluations thus far point to contradictory results regarding their effectiveness. Despite their continuing popularity with governments, greater care is needed to strengthen future evaluations and conduct such assessments away from the policy cheerleaders.     

Sustainable governance of natural resources and institutional change–an analytical framework

This article presents a conceptual framework for analysing the governance of natural resource use, as governance is often the primary issue when natural resources are overexploited and degraded. It addresses both spontaneous and active governance, including institutional change induced by development co‐operation. Drawing on existing frameworks of institutional analysis, fundamental modifications are presented to adapt the concept to the context of international co‐operation, and to include dynamic aspects of institutional change as well as multiple actor interactions. Tested in several case studies, the framework was found suitable and relevant for use in project planning and evaluation, as well as for comparing governance issues across cases in a conceptually rigorous way. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Swings and gerrymanders

It is usual for electoral analysts to calculate the swing necessary at the next election to unseat a government, assuming that the swing is a uniform one. However, swings are not uniform. The non-uniform swing which would, on average, unseat a government is shown to be different from the uniform swing. For example, at the next Australian election for the House of Representatives, a uniform swing of 1.5 per cent against the current government would cause it to lose five seats, leaving it in a minority of 73 out of 148 seats, but a non-uniform swing of only 0.8 per cent would, on average, have the same effect. Implications of this variability for the size of the majority, the possibilities of a Parliament with an even number of seats being equally-divided, and the use of this analysis to detect gerrymandering and to correct for it, are considered.