Race,Social Welfare,and the Decline of Postwar Liberalism: A New or Old Key?

Fifty-one years ago, when liberalism and social welfare democracy were expanding in all advanced industrialized nations, V.O. Key, Jr., forecast the decline of postwar liberalism in the United States. Current discussion of the decline of liberalism has ignored Key or, when evidence is lacking, has incorrectly cited him. In contrast to Key's relatively direct, simple, and heavily documented reasoning, current explanations are multifactorial, complex, less well documented, and often ideologically loaded. Some explanations for the "postwar" decline identify causal factors more than six years after the war, yet they ignore events in 1945–47. At the fifty-first anniversary of V.O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation, attention to Key's forecast and Occam's razor is called for. Key argued that racism in the South, exerted through congressional committees, would lead to a decline of liberalism in the nation. Using "legislative histories," this article compares Key's single-factor "racial" explanation with a two-factor explanation—and by implication with multifactor ones—and finds Key's more compelling and parsimonious. Archival sources indicate that more than two years before the 1948 Democratic Convention, Charlie Ross, Truman's closest advisor, and Truman himself encouraged Key to assess the emerging postwar politics of the South. As Key anticipated, institutionalized racism sunk the Fair Deal and postwar social democracy, despite Truman's efforts. The effects of racism on postwar and current politics and public administration should be reexamined as a key to understanding American distinctiveness or exceptionalism.     

Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence accountability ("oversight") encompasses the supervision of a vast range of secret activities and 15 major agencies. Oversight since 1975 has been robust compared to earlier years; yet it continues to fall short of goals espoused by the Church Committee that year, as well as by subsequent panels advocating intelligence reform. Lawmakers have responded responsibly to intelligence surprises ("fire alarms"), carrying out probes into domestic spying, assassination plots, and other questionable covert actions, counterintelligence vulnerabilities, and major intelligence failures. They have paid less attention, though, to the day-to-day "police-patrolling" that might uncover weaknesses and eliminate the need for emergency firefighting. Individual members in both branches of Congress have displayed a significant commitment to oversight activities, and now and then the full oversight committees have worked energetically as a unit. Mostly, however, intelligence accountability since 1975 has been a story of discontinuous motivation, ad hoc responses to scandals, and reliance on the initiative of just a few members of Congress—mainly the occasional dedicated committee chair—to carry the burden. Despite the recommendations of several scholarly studies and government reports, absent still is a comprehensive approach to intelligence review that mobilizes most, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate standing committees on intelligence toward a systematic plan of police-patrolling, without waiting for fire alarms.