High performance liquid chromatographic determination of alcohols with reference to body distribution of methanol

A method has been developed on reverse phase high performance liquid chromatography for simultaneous determination of methyl, ethyl and isopropyl alcohols under refractive index detection using pure water as the mobile phase. A good separation has been achieved between these alcohols. Detector response was linear with a detection limit of 5 mg/100 ml. Recovery studies were performed by adding known amounts of methyl and ethyl alcohols to blood, lung and liver within the range 80–90%. The reproducibility of the results was always >90%. The quantitative distribution of methyl alcohol in postmortem body tissues and fluids has been reported in three cases of poisoning.     

In re Browning.

HELD: Prior judicial approval is not required for a surrogate to exercise the state constitutional right of self-determination of a patient who has become incompetent and who, while competent, specifically expressed her wishes regarding medical treatment decisions orally or in writing. The surrogate, in so exercising that right, must satisfy herself that certain requirements are met.     

Indigenismo and the Avant‐garde: Jorge Sanjinés' Early Films and the National Project

Jorge Sanjinés' 1960s films Revolución and Ukamau challenge the class and ethnic hierarchies of Bolivian society by casting the proletarian and indigenous masses as revolutionary liberators. The new national imaginary they evoke is tightly bound to the experimental cinematic techniques they employ, since their rejection of rationalist, realist aesthetics signals a partial undermining of the linear time of the modern nation. Ukamau both recalls and resists previous Bolivian indigenismo, which sought to co‐opt the Indian into a national mestizo consciousness. Its exoticist portrayal of the Indian ultimately limits its political effectiveness, but textual and contextual analyses show subversive Indian agency leaking through.     

DOES DISPERSED PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IMPAIR EFFICIENCY? THE CASE OF REFUSE COLLECTION IN NORWAY

Corporate governance theory suggests that companies with dispersed and indirect ownership suffer from agency costs. A worst case is where several political authorities jointly own a company, which allows managers to operate with inferior efficiency. In political economy, the manager is not the major agency problem. Elected politicians may impair efficiency to improve their re‐election prospects. Since politicians have less influence in jointly owned firms, such companies are expected to perform better than those owned by a single public authority. Consistent with corporate governance – but not political economy – the empirical analysis suggests that dispersed municipal ownership impairs cost efficiency. In the Norwegian case of municipal refuse collection presented here, costs of dispersed ownership often outstrip gains from economies of scale. Use of jointly owned companies is not necessarily a proper response to efficiency problems inherent a fragmented local government structure.