Philadelphia's ``Black Mafia': Assessing and advancing current interpretations

In the history and the study of organizedcrime, the validity and reliability ofsources have been particularly problematicmatters. Governmental fact-finding bodiesare frequently cited in this research area,including the now-defunct PennsylvaniaCrime Commission. For example, studiesoccasionally reference Philadelphia's``Black Mafia,' and each of these inquiriesrelies upon the work of the PennsylvaniaCrime Commission for ``analysis' of thegroup. In this article, the Commission'sfindings are presented and then critiqued. Significant Black Mafia activitiesunder-researched by the Commission are nextanalyzed, adding context to the currentunderstanding of the group. The articlechallenges current assumptions, places thegroup's history in context, and illustratesthe utility of primary source research.     

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning-response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the literature—psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political—are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance.     

Implementing the artist's resale right directive

Legal context: Directive 2001/84/EC, on the resale right for the benefit ofthe author of an original work of art, introduced the harmonisationof artist's resale right within the EU (and subsequently withinthe EEA). Resale right already existed in many EU States, butthe Directive also required its creation in others (such asthe UK) to which it was previously unknown. The implementationof the Directive in the UK was accordingly a matter of somecontroversy. Key points: This article concentrates on the legal difficulties involvedin that implementation, viewed against the background of theUK Government's stated general policy on the transposition ofEU Directives. From several points of view, the rules laid downin the Directive called for elaboration or clarification, andin a number of cases such an approach was appropriate. In othercases, however, this turned out not to be appropriate. Practical significance: As a result, although in the main it was possible to transposethe Directive into a clear and workable set of domestic rules,a number of issues had to remain unresolved. Among the mostimportant were: whether works of ‘applied art’ shouldattract resale right, and the territorial scope of the transactionscovered by the right.     

Crime prevention through environmental design: financial hardship, the dynamics of power, and the prospects of governance

Borrowing from Foucault (Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), Governmentality: The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 87–104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Foucault and Gordon (Power-knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1980) and the work of governmentality scholars in general, this paper examines Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as a strategic form of governance. Using qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters, I argue that the putative availability of expendable capital mediates, although does not necessarily negate, a practitioner’s ability to secure the conduct of conduct through the sharing of CPTED expertise. The importance of shifting power dynamics are examined before evaluating the data vis-à-vis contemporary scholarship in the areas of governmentality and crime and criminal justice research.     

Entry barriers and evolution of banking systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian western bank failures

Abstract: As federal policy‐makers revise and update the Bank Act, any change should be seen in the context of public policy towards financial institutions in Canada. Rather than being condemned to repeat history, both policy‐makers and potential bank entrepreneurs would be well advised to re‐examine the Report of the Inquiry into the Collapse of the ccb and Northland Bank (August 1986), chaired by the Honourable Willard Z. Estey. Public policy for financial institutions faces the challenge of reconciling competing interests. Since 1867, Canada has experienced a nationally controlled banking system that is highly stable (i.e., few bankruptcies) and that has enabled in‐flows of capital needed for national economic development. The Canadian Commercial Bank failure raised a fundamental challenge to the government's policy agenda. When asked what the government's position should be, the three officials recommended the rescue package. All three participants from the political side advised against it. Future policy must learn the lessons from this important and atypical moment in Canadian financial history. Sommaire: Alors que les decisionnaires federaux revoient et mettent à jour la Loi sur les banques, toute modification devrait être envisagée dans le contexte de la politique gouvernementale visant les institutions financières au Canada. Plutôt que d'être condamnés à répéter les mêmes erreurs, les décisionnaires et les banquiers potentiels feraient bien mieux de réexaminer le Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la faillite de la Banque commerciale du Canada et la Norbanque (août 1986), présidée par l'honorable Willard Z. Estey. La politique gouvernementale concernant les institutions financières a la tâche difficile de réconcilier des intérêts opposés. Depuis 1867, le Canada connaît un système bancaire contrôléà l'échelle nationale qui est très stable, ayant enregistré peu de faillites, et qui a permis des rentrées de fonds nécessaires au développement économique national. La faillite de la BCC a lancé un défi fonda mental au programme de politique gouvernementale. Lorsqu'on leur a demandé quelle devrait être la position du gouvernement, les trois responsables ont recommandé le programme de renflouement. Les trois participants du secteur politique ont conseillé le contraire. Les futurs décisionnaires doivent tirer des leçons de cet évènement important et exceptionnel dans l'histoire financière canadienne.