Reviews

Terry L. Thompson & Richard Sheldon, eds, Soviet Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Vera S. Dunham. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, xiii+290 pp., £21.00.

Michael Rywkin, Soviet Society Today. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, xii+243 pp., $35.00 h/b, $12.50 p/b.

David Lane, Soviet Society Under Perestroika, London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, xv+401 pp., £40.00 h/b, £12.95 p/b.

Catherine Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise of Stalin: The Communist Party in the Capital, 1925–32. London: Macmillan, 1990, xv+328 pp., £47.50.

Roger Pethybridge, One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward: Soviet Society and Politics under the New Economic Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, xi+453 pp., £48.00.

Francois Heisbourg, ed., The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union. London: Macmillan, 1990, vi+227pp., £40.00.

Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Organisation: a Political and Organizational Analysis. London: Macmillan, 1990, 235 pp., £40.00.

Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990, xiii+236 pp., £30.00 h/b, £10.95 p/b.

Philip S. Gillette & Willard C. Frank, Jr, eds, The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct. Lexington, IN: Lexington Books, 1990, xvii+297 pp., $39.95.

Sylvia Woodby & Alfred B. Evans, Jr, eds, Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev's New Thinking. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 226 pp., £22.50.

Nikolai N. Petro, ed., Christianity and Russian Culture in Soviet Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, xi+244pp., £17.95 p/b.

David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt. London: Routledge, 1990, xi+201 pp., £30.00.

Agnes Heller & Ferenc Fehér, From Yalta to Glasnost. The Dismantling of Stalin's Empire. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, viii+288 pp., £35.00.

Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, xiv+319 pp., £35.00.

George Blazyca & Ryszard Rapacki, eds, Poland into the 1990s: Economy and Society in Transition. London: Pinter, 1991, x+148 pp., £27.50.

Michael D. Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet‐Type Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, xiv+421 pp., £45.00, $59.50.

Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. London: Longman, 1990, x+389 pp., £22.50 h/b, £12.95 p/b.

James Muckle, Portrait of Soviet School under Glasnost. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1990, ix+205 pp., £35.00.

Piers Beirne, ed., Revolution in Law: Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917–1938. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990, xiii+202 pp., $49.95.

Richard M. Connaughton, The Republic of the Ushakovka: Admiral Kolchak and the Allied Intervention in Siberia, 1918–20. London: Routledge, 1990, ix+193 pp., £30.00.

Vitaut Kipel & Zora Kipel, eds, Byelorussian Statehood—Reader and Bibliography. New York: Byelorussian Institute of Arts and Sciences, 1988, 398 pp.     

Le contrôle politique des organismes autonomes à fonctions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires

Sommaire. Le contrǒle politique des organismes autonomes à functions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires est celui qu'exercent le Parlement et le gouvernement sur l'opportunité des mesures qu'adoptent ces organismes et qui doivent ětre appréciées en regard de l'intérět général. L'octroi d'un large pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière d'élaboration et d'application de la politique suivant un processus qualifié par notre droit de quasi-judiciaire soulève des difficultés considerables qui nous obligent à revoir les principes měmes qui régissent les rapports entre ces « tribunaux administratifs » et l'autorité politique parlementaire et gouvernementale. Les techniques de contrǒle utilisées dans la législation relative aux grandes régies fédérales notamment, la cct , le crtc , l’one , sou-lèvent également des difficultés. Ainsi, lorsqu'existe un droit d'appel au gouverneur en conseil ou au ministre, on s'interroge sur la portée de ces recours par rapport aux recours à la Cour fédérale prévus par la Loi sur la Cour fédéraLe ou d'autres lois particulières. De měme lorsque la législation prévoit des moyens de contrǒle à priori, tel le pouvoir d'émettre des directives, on se demande quelles sont les sanctions possibles dans le cas où le tribunal refuse ou néglige d'y donner suite. Ces problèmes sont au coeur des recherches en cours sur certains aspects du développement des principaux tribunaux administratifs ou organismes autonomes à functions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires. Abstract. Political control of autonomous regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies is the control exercised by Parliament and the government over the actions of these bodies to assess their opportunity in regard to the general interest. The granting of wide discretionary power in the elaboration and application of policies following a procedure qualified in law as quasi-judicial raises considerable difficulties with respect to the very principles which determine the relations between these administrative tribunals and parliamentary and governmental political authority. With respect to the control techniques employed in the legislation relating especially to the major federal commissions such as the ctc , the crtc and the neb , these difficulties are particularly evident. On the one hand, when a right of appeal to the Governor-in-Council or the Minister exists, what is the extent of these remedies in relation to the recourse to the Federal Court granted by the Federal Court Act or other special statutes? When legislation provides for a priori controls such as the power to issue directives, what are the possible sanctions in the event that the tribunal refuses or neglects to follow them? These problems are at the very heart of present research on certain aspects of the development of the major administrative tribunals and autonomous bodies exercising regulatory and quasi-judicial functions.     

Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations

Presidents traditionally have had great success when nominating justices to the Supreme Court, with confirmation being the norm and rejection being the rare exception. While the confirmation process usually ends with the nominee taking a seat on the Court, however, there is a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes the Senate to act. To derive a theoretical explanation of this underlying dynamic in the confirmation process, we draw on a spatial model of presidential nominations to the Court. We then employ a hazard model to test this explanation, using data on all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since the end of the Civil War. Our primary finding is that the duration of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. We also find evidence that suggests that the duration increases for critical nominees and chief justices and decreases for older nominees, current and previous senators, and nominees with prior experience on state and federal district courts .