Can Leviathan be Democratic? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics, and State Infrastructural Power

Reconciling effective government with accountable government remains an enormous political challenge, especially in the postcolonial world. Can postcolonial states only gain infrastructural power when their rulers enjoy unencumbered despotic power? With their contradictory findings about the influence of democratic parliaments on state autonomy and capacity, the literatures on constitutional states in Western Europe and developmental states in Northeast Asia provide limited guidance on this normatively critical question. As an alternative approach, this essay proposes three causal mechanisms through which competitive national elections can incite the territorial extension of state institutions: (1) catalyzing the construction of mass ruling parties; (2) energizing state registration of marginal populations; and (3) fostering centralized intervention in local authoritarian enclaves. Evidence from Southeast Asia suggests that competitive elections will only have these infrastructural effects when accompanied by robust mass political mobilization. This has intriguing implications for how scholars understand historical patterns of state-building in the West, as well as how policymakers try to build more effective states in the most ungoverned corners of the contemporary world.     

Moral analysis and the Vietnam war

Francis X. Winters, The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963‐February 15, 1964. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997. xii, 292 pp./$? cloth.     

Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Response Latency

Eyewitness identification research has reliably shown that accurate identifications are faster than inaccurate identifications. Recently, D. Dunning and S. Perretta (2002) claimed that an identification latency of 10-12 s not only best discriminates between accurate and inaccurate identifications but also produces extremely high accuracy rates, approaching 90%. Consistent with predictions from recognition memory theory, however, we show that the optimum time boundary varies with overall response latency under manipulations of retention interval and nominal lineup size, and that the accuracy rate inside the optimum time boundary is much less impressive than previously reported. We outline directions for clarifying the accuracy and latency relationship to assist the reliable diagnosis of identification accuracy.     

Civilian self-defense militias in civil war

To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theoretic model, we argue that states take this risk in order to prevent rebels from co-opting local populations, which in turn may shift power away from the government and toward the rebels. Governments strategically use civilian militias to raise the price rebels must pay for civilian cooperation, prevent rebels from harnessing a territory’s resources, and/or to deter rebels from challenging government control in key areas. Empirically, the model suggests states are likely to support the formation of self-defense militias in territory that may moderately improve the power of rebel groups, but not in areas that are either less valuable or areas that are critical to the government’s survival. These hypotheses are tested using data from the Colombian civil war from 1996 to 2008.