American Terrorism and Extremist Crime Data Sources and Selectivity Bias: An Investigation Focusing on Homicide Events Committed by Far-Right Extremists

This paper examines the reliability of the methods used to capture homicide events committed by far-right extremists in a number of open source terrorism data sources. Although the number of research studies that use open source data to examine terrorism has grown dramatically in the last 10 years, there has yet to be a study that examines issues related to selectivity bias. After reviewing limitations of existing terrorism studies and the major sources of data on terrorism and violent extremist criminal activity, we compare the estimates of these homicide events from 10 sources used to create the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). We document incidents that sources either incorrectly exclude or include based upon their inclusion criteria. We use a “catchment-re-catchment” analysis and find that the inclusion of additional sources result in decreasing numbers of target events not identified in previous sources and a steadily increasing number of events that were identified in any of the previous data sources. This finding indicates that collectively the sources are approaching capturing the universe of eligible events. Next, we assess the effects of procedural differences on these estimates. We find considerable variation in the number of events captured by sources. Sources include some events that are contrary to their inclusion criteria and exclude others that meet their criteria. Importantly, though, the attributes of victim, suspect, and incident characteristics are generally similar across data source. This finding supports the notion that scholars using open-source data are using data that is representative of the larger universe they are interested in. The implications for terrorism and open source research are discussed.     

Only the Bad Die Young: The Correlates of Organizational Death for Far-Right Extremist Groups

The domestic far-right movement has existed in the United States for many years. During that time, groups have appeared, disappeared, and reappeared. Unfortunately, very little is known about what causes these groups to disband. Prior research has focused on long-lived groups, but the majority of extremist or terrorist groups fail to survive for an extended period of time. This study examined a variety of external and internal correlates of organizational death identified from both terrorism and organizational literature, to empirically test which correlates lead to a group dying young.     

Law Enforcement Fusion Centers: Cultivating an Information Sharing Environment while Safeguarding Privacy

The national network of fusion centers, of which there are currently 78 nationwide, was created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and continue to play an integral role in contemporary law enforcement. Their mission, put simply, is to facilitate information sharing across disparate agencies and organizations. Despite a significant presence within the law enforcement landscape, fusion centers have received relatively minimal scholarly attention. This limited literature alludes to operational challenges and public concerns that inhibit fusion center effectiveness. More specifically, little information is known about how fusion centers develop relationships with external partners as well as institute mechanisms to safeguard against violations of individual privacy. The present research employs a combination of national survey data and three in-depth case studies of fusion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan to provide initial answers to these questions. Implications for improved policy and practice are discussed.     

Surveying American State Police Agencies About Lone Wolves,Far-Right Criminality,and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal Collaboration

This study presents state police agencies’ perceptions about three significant terrorism issues on which there is little empirical research. All three issues have significant implications for understanding the role of state police agencies in responding to terrorism threats. First, the authors investigated whether the respondents believed that supporters of specified extremist movements tended to commit crimes as lone wolves, with others, or both alone and with others. Second, they were asked to provide data to gauge how often far-right extremists committed 13 crime types that varied in magnitude and motivation. Third, they were asked if they had knowledge about whether far-right extremists and Islamic jihadists had cooperated to commit crimes. These data were collected by surveying the 50 state police agencies in the United States. The results indicate that state police officials are concerned with both group and lone-wolf activities. Importantly, there was variation in the potential for lone-wolf crimes when comparing different types of extremist movements. The results indicate that far-right extremists are involved in a range of terrorist, preparatory, and routine criminal activities, but this involvement varies by region. Two state police agencies also indicated that they knew of Islamic and far-right collaboration. The study identified two other instances of direct collaboration and a number of other interesting cases through open source searches. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings and outlines directions for future research.     

The Influence of External and Internal Correlates on the Organizational Death of Domestic Far-Right Extremist Groups

The domestic far-right movement has existed in the United States for many years. During that time, groups have appeared, disappeared, and reappeared. Unfortunately, very little is known about what causes these groups to disband. An interdisciplinary approach identified external and internal correlates of organizational death to empirically test which of these correlates influences whether a group dies. Results from this study provided empirical support for some previously only anecdotal explanations for organizational death, while also undermining other claims.     

Comparing Extremist Perpetrators of Suicide and Non-Suicide Attacks in the United States

ABSTRACT

This study explores differences in perpetrators of suicide attacks and non-suicide attacks in the United States. The study uses data on far-right and Al Qaeda and affiliated/inspired terrorists between 1990 and 2013 from the United States Extremist Crime Database. Our analysis estimates logistic regression models to test whether suicide attackers were more likely to have exhibited specific risk factors for suicidality, while examining other prominent claims regarding patterns of suicide terrorism. Suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide or to have been diagnosed as mentally ill. Suicide attackers were more likely, though, to have a history of substance abuse, to be loners, have served in the military, participated in paramilitary training, and be more ideologically committed to the cause. We found that Al Qaeda affiliated/inspired attackers were more likely than far-right attackers to have engaged in a suicide mission. With the current focus on Americans traveling to Syria and Iraq to receive training and fight for jihadist movements (e.g., the Islamic State), our findings appear relevant. Observers have expressed concern that these fighters may return and then commit attacks in their homeland. Law enforcement could make use of this study’s findings.     

Assessing nation-state-sponsored cyberattacks using aspects of Situational Crime Prevention

Research Summary

This study utilized a quantitative analysis of 246 cyberattack incidents reported in the Extremist CyberCrime Database to identify significant predictors of nation-state-sponsored cyberattacks relative to those performed by non-nation-state-sponsored ideological actors. Clarke and Newman's Situational Crime Prevention framework for terrorism was used to identify differential opportunities to successfully affect targets on the basis of tools, weapons, and the ability to access targets in online settings. The analysis noted nation-state-sponsored attacks were less likely to use high-visibility attack methods and more likely to utilize attack methods leading to data breaches. In addition, they were more likely to target state governments and military entities relative to ideological actors.

Policy Implications

Nation-state attacks are more difficult to identify or mitigate while in process, requiring a more robust national cybersecurity policy framework to be implemented that moves beyond current practices. There is a need to better utilize all aspects of government, from legislation to grant funding, in order to deter cyberattacks from continuing into the future.