Gangs and Violence: Disentangling the Impact of Gang Membership on the Level and Nature of Offending

Objectives

To determine whether membership in youth gangs provides a unique social forum for violence amplification. This study examines whether gang membership increases the odds of violent offending over and above involvement in general delinquent and criminal behavior.

Methods

Five waves of data from a multi-site (seven cities) panel study of over 3,700 youth originally nested within 31 schools are analyzed. We estimate four level repeated measures item response theory models, which include a parameter to differentiate the difference in the log of the expected event-rate for violent offense items to the log of the expected event-rate for nonviolent offense items.

Results

Depending on the comparison group (gang youth, overall sample), periods of active gang membership were associated with a 10 or 21% increase in the odds of involvement in violent incidents. When the sample is restricted to youth who report gang membership during the study, the proportionate increase in the odds of violence associated with gangs is statistically similar for males and females. After youth reported leaving the gang their propensity for violence was not significantly different than comparison group observations, although levels of general offending remain elevated.

Conclusions

While results are limited by the school-based sampling strategy, the importance of gang prevention and intervention programming for violence reduction is highlighted. Preventing youth from gang membership or shortening the length of gang careers through interventions may reduce absolute levels of violence.     

Self-represented litigants: the overlooked and unintended consequence of legal aid reform

The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) comes into force in April 2013 and is widely expected to lead to an increase in the number of self-representing litigants (SRLs) in the family courts. Taking a practitioner focus, this article considers the negative impact of this increase and considers possible measures for combating the practical pitfalls such a growth in SRLs presents.     

IBSA's trilateral constellation and its development fund: Valuable pioneers in development cooperation?

With a changing geopolitical landscape following the Northern-induced global financial meltdown, stagnation on global governance reform and failure to reach agreement on issues ranging from trade (Doha Development Round) to climate change (United Nations Convention on Climate Change), the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum finds itself at the proverbial crossroads. At this point, with no summit having taken place since 2011, the future of IBSA is uncertain in part because the three IBSA partners have allowed ambivalence and lack of leadership to hold sway. Yet the current fluidity in the international environment has ironically meant that IBSA is more relevant and needed than ever before. IBSA is well placed to play a vital role in arresting the current trajectory of the global governance architecture, particularly when it comes to concerns of development. As this article argues, it is in the area of development cooperation that IBSA has found its niche in demonstrating the possibilities that development diplomacy and South–South cooperation avail, while challenging traditional norm conceptions when it comes to the future of international development financial institutions. Yet the question remains as to how this will be used going forward, as there is little strategic discussion between the trilateral partners on the future of development diplomacy and the IBSA Fund.     

The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa,Brazil, India and trilateralism

In the aftermath of 9/11 surely of great significance is the reassertion of the South – North divide as a defining axis of the international system. In this context the emergence of a coterie of Southern countries actively challenging the position and assumptions of the leading states of the North is an especially significant event. The activism on the part of three middle-income developing countries in particular—South Africa, Brazil and India—has resulted in the creation of a ‘trilateralist’ diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in the wake of globalisation. This article will examine the rise of the co-operative strategy known as ‘trilateralism’ by regional leaders within the South. Specifically it will look at the relationship between emerging regional powers in the context of multilateralism, as well as at the formulation and implementation of trilateralism. As with previous co-operative efforts in the developing world, the prospects of success are rooted in overlapping domestic, regional and international influences on South African, Brazilian and Indian foreign policies. The article will conclude with an assessment of these influences over the trilateral agenda.     

Modernising Local Government: Micro-Organisational Reform and Changing Local Structural Configurations

This article takes an indicative group of county, metropolitan and unitary authorities located in the English West Midlands to examine how effectively local government is grappling with modernising’ reforms in a context where the appropriate unit of analysis has become problematic because of broader changes to local governance. Sub-national territorial structural variability is becoming more pronounced while, paradoxically, what stands out in the micro-organisational dimension is the extent to which local authorities are increasingly working to a common reform agenda, notwithstanding the need to resolve incoherences in New Labour's modernisation project. The explanation for these observed (contrary) changes lies not only in the vagaries of top-down pressures emanating from central political and regulatory infiuences, but also in local institutional dynamics, as well as in lateral or peer dissemination of ‘good’ practice within local government.     

Illiberal democracy and violent conflict in contemporary Indonesia

When Indonesia's President Suharto was forced to resign in 1998, the accompanying uncertainty triggered serious communal violence in five regions. As the nation's politics and economy stabilized from 2002, so did those provinces. Identity-based conflict is now the rare exception rather than the rule in democratic Indonesia. Yet puzzlingly, despite the consolidation of democracy, ethnic clashes and mob violence against religious minorities continue to occur. While such events are now far smaller than those in the first years of democratization and occur only occasionally, their persistence requires analysis given the potential for escalation and what it tells us about Indonesia's reform process. In this article I compare recent incidents with that of the initial post-authoritarian era, and find that identity-based collective violence persists because many important causes of conflict have not been removed by democratic consolidation. As found by numerous scholars, many illiberal characteristics of the authoritarian state have segued neatly into democratic Indonesia. I assert that this has left several main causes of group violence firmly in place. I further contend that the failure to remove these phenomena partly has its origins in the order of democratic reforms chosen in the years after Suharto's resignation.     

Understanding Perspectives on WMD and Why They Are Important

Although contemporary jihadist terrorists are most well known for perpetrating operations that generate mass casualties, they also conduct violent acts that yield fewer victims, such as beheading hostages. Examining the religious and cultural contexts that surround jihadist beheadings, developments in new media, and drawing on examples from the Chechen Wars and the Iraq War, this article argues that jihadists have employed this tactic for a range of reasons, including obtaining ransom payments, hampering foreign investment, discrediting transitional states, and recruiting supporters. It also suggests that jihadists' beheading of their captives corresponds with aspects of cosmic war, particularly on how religious terrorists' desires to please a deity and secure a place of honor in the hereafter has devalued the lives of both captor and prisoner. Consequently, contemporary jihadist beheading is an outgrowth of the practice of terrorist hostage taking. As this article goes to press (February 2007) UK authorities disrupted a terrorist cell allegedly plotting to behead British Muslim soldiers who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to broadcast the filmed executions through jihadist websites. Journalists have described the intended beheadings and their dissemination as “Iraq-style.” There is no doubt that jihadist beheading became more widely known as a result of the Iraq conflict. However, the beheadings in Iraq were largely used to recruit future jihadists and to demonstrate jihadists' strength to their potential support base, the global Muslim community. In contrast, the alleged UK beheading plot was aimed at striking terror into Muslims living in the UK so that they would not support or serve their government. Indeed the Iraq beheadings were intended to persuade, and the UK plot was intended to dissuade. These alleged activities suggest that contemporary jihadist beheading is not only an extension of hostage-taking, it is also an independently evolving terrorist tactic.