Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: The British Columbia Experience

In 2001, the province of British Columbia (BC) became the first Canadian jurisdiction to enact anti-SLAPP legislation. While this legislation proved to be short lived, the BC experience around the issue of SLAPPs is instructive for law reformers both in Canada and beyond. In this article, the authors describe the legal and political processes that set the stage for the passage of the 2001 law, and its subsequent repeal. They also provide a detailed analysis and critique of key aspects of the debate surrounding the design of the law, and consider its efficacy in identifying, dismissing and deterring SLAPP lawsuits. They conclude with some observations with respect to the current status of the SLAPP issue in BC.     

The effect of linkage on the calculation of DNA match probabilities for siblings and half siblings

The loci in many forensic multiplexes are often selected to avoid linked loci. However as the multiplices used increase in the number of loci represented instances are occurring of loci that are loosely linked. As yet little attention has been paid to the likely consequence of this. We begin the process of developing formulae to give the match probability at two linked loci for full and half siblings. The methodology proceeds from the previously published joint IBD states for two linked loci [B.K. Suarez, J. Rice, T. Reich, The generalized sib pair IBD distribution: its use in the detection of linkage, Ann. Hum. Genet. Lond. 42 (1978) 87; J.K. Haseman, R.C. Elston, The investigation of linkage between a quantitative trait and a marker locus, Behav. Genet. 2 (1972) 3–19]. Our formulation has the drawback of assuming linkage equilibrium. This assumption may be tenable as a first order approximation. We hope to stimulate work on developing better treatments.     

Limits to growth: The case of Dutch prison capacity

This article deals with the question of why the dentention capacity in the Netherlands has been increasing since 1975, and what the consequences are for the future. Analysis is based on literature. Dutch policy is reactive: capacity depends on the sum of detention sentences. The interaction between the judicial system and its political imbedding leads to a continuous growth in detention capacity. This spin-off process is also active when crime is not increasing. As a consequence, continuation of this growth is to be expected. It is not clear whether judges allow capacity to affect the length of the prison sentences they pass. If so, a spiral process is going on, where the increase in capacity fuels the need for a greater capacity in the future. In theory, this spiral could also go downwards. Therefore, when the spiral is stronger than the spin-off, a pro-active government policy could lead to a reduction in capacity. However, as it is not clear that this is the case, it is concluded that the detention capacity could best be reduced by ad hoc measures like legalising drugs.     

Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach

The foregoing analysis developed the paradigm of self-interest motivated revolutionary activities. In effect, the construct presented differs from the by-product theory developed by Tullock only in its specific modeling of government-created rents as the engine which drives the violent political behavior. The empirical test of the positive relationship between rent creation by the government and the amount of destabilizing political activity yields strong support for the structuring of politically destabilizing activities as rent-seeking in nature. It is the authors' hope that further empirical investigation and a more general and rigorous modeling of revolution as a rent-seeking activity will become an important part of the literature in public choice.Finally, some policy implications should be discussed. The policy emphasis for the governments of Africa countries should be on opening the economy to competition. Instituting programs to make the economic system more accessible to all segments of society would result in reduced opportunities for rent-seeking. Reducing rent-seeking should result in increased political stability. A reduction in government market intervention would also reduce the costs of government regulations on individual entrepreneurs inducing them to increase their participation in economically productive activities. Taken together the result would be increased political stability and higher rates of economic growth.