A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

Public Choice - This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. We first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then...     

Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration

Abstract: The interdisciplinary discourse on European law seems paradoxical. While the editors of this Journal plead for a contextual jurisprudence, political scientists are discovering the importance of law for the integration process. This article explores the merits and problems of both of these shifts¹. On the one hand, it points to implicit assumptions of legal arguments that need to be contrasted with the insights of political sciences into mechanisms of integration processes and the functioning of inter-governmental bargaining - and is thus to be read as an appeal for a 'contextual' jurisprudence. On the other hand, it argues that political science analyses, even when they take the legal dimension of European integration into account, tend to rely upon an instrumentalist view of the legal system which fails to acknowledge the Law's normative logic and discursive power. This theoretically complex argument is exemplified first by an analysis of the tensions between the legal supranationalism of the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court's defence of national constitutionalism, already intensively discussed in this Journal². What the article adds is an extension of the constitutional debate to the economy. It argues that Europe cannot, and should not, be based upon a dichotomous structure of (national) political rights and (European) economic liberties.     

Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition ofArrow's (1951/1963) and Sen's (1970/1979)social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of anindividual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a singlescalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensionalgeneralization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representingindividual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfarefunctions, corresponding to multiple `dimensions' of welfare.I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence ofattractive aggregation procedures depends on certaininformational assumptions, specifically about themeasurability of welfare and its comparability not only acrossindividuals but also across dimensions. I state severalimpossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-typeconditions, insufficient comparability across individualsleads to dictatorship of a single individual, whileinsufficient comparability across dimensions leads todominance of a single dimension. Given sufficientcomparability both across individuals and across dimensions, arange of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantiveimplications of the results.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.